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In this article, we focus on how the United Kingdom, Germany and Norway govern and balance 
young unemployed claimants’ right to social benefits with conditions of compulsory activities, 
with the aim of their transition into employment. In the three countries mentioned, we have 
examined and compared the national legislation and regulations, as well as how case workers 
in job centres experience these tools in their work with activating the young unemployed. 
Balancing the individuals’ right of benefits with the job centre’s right and duty to impose 
conditions and activities as well as to sanction non-compliance, is also a matter of balancing 
national legislation with international human rights instruments. We have therefore analysed 
the three countries’ legislation and job centre conduct in light of the human right to non-
discrimination and equality. 
To find answers to our research questions, we have studied the legal framework and human 
rights instruments addressing social security, conditionality and non-discrimination, and 
interviewed caseworkers regarding their leeway for individual professional discretion. 
We find that the human right of substantive equality is challenged in all three countries. 
Claimants’ commitments can entail stigma, stereotyping and shame, legislation can fail to 
provide the leeway necessary for accommodating for differences between the individuals, and 
sanctioning can represent a system of paternalism rather than social citizenship. 
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1. Introduction: Research Questions and Purpose 
 
This article is based on our conception of compulsory conditions attached to the benefit of social 
assistance influencing the work of professionals. The compulsory work-related or work-
promoting activities might be conceived either as a carrot or as a stick by the professionals 
administering social benefits. Furthermore, this article is grounded in the conception that 
compulsory work-related conditions change the character of the human right to social assistance 
as the last resort for economic support. 
Carmel and Papadopoulos define governance as ‘the attempt to “steer” the behaviour of 
individuals, groups or institutions towards particular social and politico-economic goals via a 
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set of institutions and processes that aim to maintain or change the status quo’.1 Based on this 
definition of governance, this article aims to study legislation and regulations as well as the 
organisational arrangements and procedures for delivery of activation policies.2 An overall goal 
of our research project is to explore how States attempt to ‘steer’ the behaviour of social 
assistance recipients with the aim of entering the work market. 
In 2017, Norway replaced the discretionary access for authorities to impose requirements of 
work-related activities for young unemployed recipients of social assistance with a universal 
compulsory duty of activity laid onto the individual. This amendment was based on the belief 
that imposed activities, rather than committed activities, are necessary for the transition to work 
for younger persons.3 The law’s amendment is in line with the increasingly severe legal 
requirements by other European countries regarding eligibility for either social insurance based 
benefits or social assistance.4 Yet, when it comes to compulsory activities, Norway’s 
introduction of this type of behavioural condition appears rather late compared to other 
European countries such as France, the United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Sweden.5 
Although Norway was part of the first wave of introduction of activation requirements as an 
eligibility condition for social assistance, it did not have any compulsory activities for social 
assistance recipients until they were introduced in 2016. Moreira and Lødemel call the 
introduction of compulsory work-promoting activation programmes in various European 
countries between the period of 1998 and 2008 ‘the second wave of activation reforms’, the 
first wave lasting from 1990 until1998 with great differences between European countries, yet 
with a shared commitment to invest in the human capital of participants.6 Based on the later 
introduction of compulsory activities in Norway, we are interested in examining types of 
steering methods directed at unemployed young individuals in other, more experienced 
countries.  
European studies show that transition into the labour market is particularly challenging for 
young people who have dropped out of the education system, those with impaired physical 
health and mental issues, with disabilities, young immigrants, young homeless persons, and 
young persons who have been under child protection orders.7 With regard to the recent 
Norwegian law amendment, our research is therefore targeted at the young unemployed. Our 
research interest is based on the premise that targeting and individual methods must be in place 
for providing support to the young unemployed trying to enter the labour market.8 Compulsory 
activation might allow for less flexible methods. From that perspective, conditionality may 
seem counterproductive for bridging the gap from unemployment to employment. Other 
countries in Europe have had rules on conditionality and compulsory activation for a longer 
                                                 
1 E. Carmel and T. Papadopoulos, ‘The new governance of social security in Britain’, in: J. Millar (ed), 
Understanding social security: Issues for social policy and practice (Bristol: Policy Press, 2003) 93-110.  
2 Inspired by the work of various contributors in a book edited by A. Moreira and I. Lødemel (eds), Activation or 
Workfare? Governance and the Neo-Liberal Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
3 A.A. Kane and J. Köhler-Olsen, ‘Aktivitetsplikt for sosialhjelpsmottakere – har lovgiveren funnet opp hjulet på 
nytt?’, Tidsskrift for erstatningsrett, forsikringsrett og velferdsrett (4) (2015) 262-291; A.A. Kane, J. Köhler-Olsen 
and C. Reedtz, ‘Aktivisering av unge sosialhjelpsmottakere –forutsetninger for overgang til arbeid’, Tidsskrift for 
velferdsforskning (2) (2017) 117-113. 
4 S.C. Matteucci and S. Halliday (eds), Social Rights in Europe in an Age of Austerity (London: Routledge, 2018).  
5 For a similar comparison on the structure of unemployment protection see M. Adler and L.I. Terum, ‘Austerity, 
conditionality & litigation’, in: S.C. Matteucci and S. Halliday (eds), Social Rights in Europe in an Age of Austerity 
(London: Routledge, 2018) 147-169. 
6 A. Moreira and I. Lødemel, ‘Introduction’, in: A. Moreira and I. Lødemel (eds), Activation or Workfare? 
Governance and the Neo-Liberal Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 1-14.   
7 Eurofound, Active inclusion of young people with disabilities or health problems, (Luxembourg: Publications 
office of the European Union, 2013).  
8 Kane and Köhler-Olsen, ‘Aktivitetsplikt for sosialhjelpsmottakere’ (n 3); and Kane, Köhler-Olsen and Reedtz, 
‘Aktivisering av unge sosialhjelpsmottakere’ (n 3). 
2 
 
period of time than Norway. Our first research question is therefore: What type of legislation 
and regulations are in place for governing young unemployed in the UK, Germany and 
Norway?  
Working with the young unemployed means working with individuals representing a variety 
of characteristics, resources and challenges. This calls for professional discretion involving 
individual assessments and considerations in each case. The term discretion can have different 
meanings. Legislation can present criteria that have no clear boundaries, e.g. ‘in need’. To 
interpret such wording and to apply it in given cases, a case worker must apply professional 
discretion with regard both to what the term ‘in need’ is meant to address and to whether the 
term covers the situation in a given case. For decisions based on legal criteria, authorities will 
often apply professional discretion in order to find the most adequate solution in each individual 
case. Thus, professional discretion represents a tool for making individually tailored decisions 
in line with the legal purposes. Case workers in all three countries must, based on their national 
legislation, apply discretion and make decisions regarding benefits and compulsory activities 
for the young unemployed. This leads us to our second research question: How do case workers 
in the UK, Germany and Norway experience these tools for the governance of activation?  
Though belonging to different typologies of welfare regimes, all three countries are State 
Parties to international human rights conventions demanding the provision of social rights to 
all citizens. Governance steering must therefore be in line with the three countries’ international 
human rights obligations. Our third research aim is therefore to examine whether behavioural 
conditions and sanctions are leading to equality understood as the fulfilment of the State’s 
obligation to implement work-promoting policy in light of the right to non-discrimination. The 
third research question is: What type of social benefit system for young unemployed is in line 





2.1 Legal method and legal sources 
 
In order to answer to our research problems we will apply legal, qualitative and legal-
sociological research methods.  
Initially, we give an account of legal frameworks in the UK, Germany and Norway regarding 
the eligibility to basic income and work-promoting assistance for young unemployed persons. 
We also examine legal frameworks regulating how work-promoting activities can be offered, 
complied with and be compulsory in character, as well as the sanctioning of non-compliance. 
Legal sources include international human rights instruments, national legislation, preparatory 
works, international and national jurisprudence, department guidance and other regulations, as 
well as legal literature. Our presentation and interpretation of the legal sources is based on a 
common law legal-dogmatic method. If the plain meaning of the rule does not reveal itself 
easily from the text, we search for the legislators’ meaning of the rule by reading preparatory 
work or department guidance. Furthermore, we might need to ask which void or problem the 
legislation was designed to address, trying to find the legislative purpose using the objective 
teleological method.9 
Various international and regional human rights conventions include norms regarding the 
right to social benefits and the right to non-discrimination. The UK, Germany and Norway 
follow a dualistic system regarding international law; treaties and agreements ratified by the 
                                                 
9  T. Lundmark and H. Waller, ‘Using statutes and cases in common and civil law’, Transnational Legal Theory 
7(4) (2016) 429-469. 
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national parliament have no direct effect until and unless incorporated into domestic law.10 The 
three countries have all incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) 
in their national legislation, and the Convention holds the status of ordinary national law.  
Four global and one regional human rights sets of conventions are incorporated by the 
Norwegian Human Rights Act of 1999. Furthermore, Section 3 of this Act states that provisions 
of the conventions and protocols incorporated shall take precedence over any other legislative 
provisions that conflict with them. The incorporated conventions have, thus, a so-called semi-
constitutional status in Norwegian law, whereas the ECHR is of ordinary status in British and 
German law.  
Human rights law not incorporated into national law is of relevance in all three countries’ 
legal systems. The impact on domestic law is visible in the interpretation of legislation, the 
consideration of public policy and the assessment of the legality of the exercise of 
administrative discretion. In all three countries’ legal method and tradition, international law is 
not ranked higher than ordinary legislation.11 However, a principle prevails that in case of 
doubt, a national law is to be constructed so as not to conflict with international law.12   
Based on Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, we will interpret 
international human rights treaties in good faith with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. In addition to the 
Convention text, we will use subsequent practice in the interpretation of the treaty, such as the 
practice of supervisory bodies like various Supervisory Committees and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The ECtHR has developed jurisprudence regarding the equality guarantee in Article 14 of 
the ECHR, redressing disadvantage due to stereotypes, prejudice, humiliation and violence, 
facilitating participation and accommodating difference, including through structural change in 
a more robust manner.13 These multidimensional features must be redressed to achieve 
substantial equality.14 We have chosen to copy and follow the Court’s way of analysing the 
question of discrimination and whether the State’s system is supporting equality. In this respect, 
we need to point out that we will not conclude firmly whether one or several countries are in 
breach of the ECHR right to non-discrimination read in conjunction with the right to social 
security. Yet, our analysis along the Court’s line of analysis provides points of discussions on 
whether the British, German and Norwegian social systems provide equality of opportunity, 
equality of result and equality of dignity.15  
While all three countries are members of the Council of Europe and States Parties to the 
ECHR, only the UK and Germany are members of the European Union (EU).16 As Member 
States of the EU, national courts and authorities must apply to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the Charter, the EU Charter) when EU law is at stake. The 
Charter is considered to be part of Union primary law and must, like any norm of Union law, 
                                                 
10 R. Clayton and H. Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
11 B.A. Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary -. Dictionaries of International Law, No. 2 (Oxford: The 
Scarecrow Press, 2005) 13.  
12 A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 230. 
13 S. Fredman, ‘Emerging from the Shadows: Substantive Equality and Article 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review 16 (2016) 273-301 at 273; S. Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality 
Revisited’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(3) (2016) 712-734 at 730. 
14 Fredman, ‘Emerging from the Shadows (n 13) 274.  
15 Ibid.  
16 The UK has voted to leave the European Union and departs at 11 pm UK time on Friday 29 March, 2019. A. 
Hunt and B. Wheeler, BBC News UK. ‘Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU’, 21 June 2018. 
1 October 2018 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887>. Norway is a Member State of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) which does not fall under the ambit of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
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be respected when this body of law is applied by courts or authorities.17 However, the rule of 
application in national law is somewhat restricted. Article 51 (1) of the Charter states that the 
Charter is addressed to the Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’.  
Despite this restriction on the direct application of the EU Charter in national law, the UK 
resisted the application of the Charter at the national level altogether, and instead obtained 
inclusion of the separate Protocol No. 30 relating to the application to the Charter in the UK.18 
This leads to two different systems in the UK and Germany regarding the application of the 
Charter. Firstly, we give account of the main rule of application regarding Germany, and 
secondly, we will present the scope of application according to Protocol No. 30.  
German courts and authorities, as well other EU Member States, when confronted with 
problems of purely national law, are not obliged to apply the Charter. This can be read out of 
Charter Article 51 (2) stressing that the provisions of the Charter are not intended to extend the 
competences and powers of the Union. Allan Rosas, judge of the European Court of Justice, 
argues that in cases on purely national law, national courts and authorities should instead rely 
on the national constitutional Bill of Rights as well as the international human rights instruments 
which are binding on the Member States in question.19 The term ‘implementing Union Law’ 
should, furthermore, be interpreted narrowly. This is in order to avoid that the European Court 
of Justice and national courts of Union Member States would become something close to human 
rights courts, due to the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to find areas where Union 
law is totally absent.20  
The aim of Protocol No. 30, binding for the UK, is to ensure that the Charter should not be 
able to overturn national law. Also, Article 2 of the Protocol No. 30 states that the Charter 
applies to the UK only ‘to the extent that the rights or principles that it contains are recognised 
in the law or practices of…the United Kingdom’. This prohibition of powers, it is argued, has 
little if any practical effect. David Anders Q.C. and Cian C. Murphy point out that this little 
practical effect is due to the fact that: 
 
… national and EU courts have long possessed the competence to measure national law 
within the scope of EU law against the yardstick of EU fundamental rights, freedoms and 
principles, and since those rights freedoms and principles are said only to be re-affirmed 
by the Charter it will no doubt be argued – with some force – that the Article 1(1) 
prohibition on the extension of powers has little if any practical effect.21 
 
Notwithstanding that the UK and Germany belong to two different systems of application of 
the EU Charter, we argue that the answer to the question of direct application of the Charter’s 
social rights and principles by national courts and authorities is very similar for both systems.  
Article 52 (5) of the Charter states that those provisions of the Charter containing principles, 
may be implemented by Member States when they are implementing Union law. These 
principles shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such Union law acts and in 
the ruling of such Union law. Article 1 (2) of Protocol No. 30 states something quite similar. 
The Charter’s solidarity rights and principles receive special treatment in Article 1(2) of the 
Protocol. These solidarity rights do not ‘in particular and for the avoidance of doubt’ create 
                                                 
17 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 6 (1) states that the Charter 
‘shall have the same legal values as the Treaties’ by that endowing it with the status of Union primary law.  
18 Also Poland and the Czech Republic are Member States to Protocol No 30.  
19 A. Rosas, ‘When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights applicable at national level?’, Jurisprudence 19(4) 
(2012) 1269-1288 at 1269 
20 Ibid 1281. 
21 David Anders Q.C. and C.C. Murphy, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights: History and Prospects in Post-
Lisbon Europe’, EUI Working Paper Law 2011/08 1-30 at 11.  
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justiciable rights for the UK except insofar as is provided for in UK national laws.22 Thus, with 
regard to social rights and principles as laid down in the Charter Title IV, these rights and 
principles can only be applied directly by German national courts when interpreting Union Law 
(Article 52 (5) of the Charter), and only be directly applied by UK national courts if such rights 
are provided for in UK national law (Protocol No. 30 Article 1 (2)). If social rights and 
principles of the Charter are not part of Union Law, German national courts cannot apply it, 
and likewise, UK courts cannot apply social rights and principles of the Charter if these rights 
are not found in national law.23 Since very few social rights are part of Union law, German 
courts and authorities must only rarely apply the EU Charter’s social rights and principles 
directly, just like the UK is not required to apply the EU Charter’s social rights and principles 
directly, if not provided for in national law.  
Certain social rights are part of EU secondary law, such as the right to non-discrimination 
based on gender (Gender Equality Directive No 2006/54/EC) and racial discrimination (Racial 
Equality Directive no 200/43/EC). We would argue that social rights and principles of the EU 
Charter Title IV related to gender – and racial-based discrimination are to be respected and 
observed when Germany is implementing these two directives in national law. With respect to 
the question of direct application in the UK, the relevant Charter rights and principles are 
probably directly applicable since the UK as a Member State of the Union is obliged to 
implement these two directives on non-discrimination. Thus, these two directives have 
informed the national law of the UK.  
However, there is no EU secondary law regarding the right to social security. This leads to 
the fact that neither German nor British courts nor authorities must respect the fundamental 
social right laid down in the EU Charter with regard to social security and social assistance in 
Article 34. This leads to a weak protection of social rights by the lack of direct application of 
Article 34 of the EU Charter.  
The weak protection of social rights is also visible in the reluctant application of worker’s 
rights by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ has in two cases shown clear reluctance 
to consider workers’ rights to fall within the scope of Union law even though these are protected 
under the EU Charter on fundamental rights. The social rights of the workers were not 
considered to be directly applicable as required by Article 51 (1) of the Charter because the ECJ 
did not consider these workers’ rights to be part of Union law, and by that fall under the ambit 
of Article 52 (5).24  
In conclusion, the EU Charter on fundamental rights on social security must not be applied 
directly by either German or UK courts or authorities. Thus, we have decided not to include 
Article 34 of the EU Charter on social security and social assistance as a legal source in our 
research. Since it is not directly applicable to hold German and UK authorities legally 
accountable for their policies on social benefits, and since Norway is not a Member State of the 
EU, as well as for the sake of restricting the amount of legal sources in this particular research, 
we find it well-founded to exclude this source for legal interpretation of German and UK 
national law. 
                                                 
22 Ibid 11-12. 
23 Ibid 12.  
24 Case C-176/12, Association de mediation sociale, Judgment of 15 January 2014, concerning the right to 
information and consultation with the undertaking (The EU Charter Article 27). Case C-117/14, Nisttahus Poclava, 
Judgement of 5 February 2015 concerning the right to protection in the event of unjustified dismissal (The EU 
Charter Article 30). Pointing to the case C-176/12, Association de mediation sociale, some have argued for a 
broader interpretation of what should be considered to be Union law. See: M. Delfino, ‘The Court and the Charter 
– A “Consistent” Interpretation of Fundamental Social Rights and Principles’, European Labour Law Journal 6(1) 
(2015) 86-99. Also: L.J. Quesada, ‘Social rights in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union: the 
opening to the Turin Process’, Conference on Social rights in today’s Europe: The role of domestic and European 




2.2 Qualitative method 
 
Our research aim is not only to scrutinise and compare three countries’ legislation and 
regulations on social benefits and conditionality, but also to examine the organisational 
arrangements and procedures for delivery of activation policies. We have therefore also 
gathered information and insight from professionals working in institutions set up to ‘steer’ the 
behaviours of individuals. We have chosen to focus on the young unemployed, based on the 
fact that Norway’s introduction of compulsory activities as a condition for social assistance 
targeted claimants under the age of 30. Also, we have previously pointed to European research 
showing that younger claimants are particularly at risk of exclusion from the labour market, 
due to lack of education and qualifications, and impaired physical and mental health. 
Additionally, young immigrants, disabled, homeless and youth who have been under child 
protection orders, have greater difficulties in finding work.25 
Choosing the United Kingdom and Germany for comparison with Norway is based on our 
previous knowledge of the introduction of compulsory activities for social benefits recipients 
in these countries. To get an insight into how Job Centres in the UK, Germany and Norway 
carry out their work with the young unemployed, we have gathered information from two 
agencies in Germany and one agency in both Great Britain and Norway, in cities with a 
population of between 50,000 and 600,000. Notwithstanding the fact that the number of 
interviews is not representative for all job centres in the three countries, we think that our 
respondents’ descriptions can show some patterns and insights with transfer value regarding 
how legislation is understood and applied in the governing of the young unemployed.   
 
2.3 Data and selection method 
 
We have gathered data from group interviews and individual interviews with caseworkers, and 
casework leaders, representing a variety of qualifications and work experiences, all working 
with young unemployed. Access to respondents was obtained through contacting the agencies’ 
management, in the UK in a regional office (Jobcentre Plus) and in Norway in a local Labour 
and Welfare Administration office (NAV). In Germany, we interviewed in two job centres in 
two different cities, due to the organisation of the job centres being different within these two 
municipalities (see further below, Section 3.3). 
After informing about our research project and asking for interviews with caseworkers 
working with young unemployed people in local Job Centres, we were given access to our 
respondents. In the British Job Centre, we interviewed a group of 10 caseworkers and then two 
individual caseworkers. In Norway we interviewed two caseworkers individually. The Job 
Centres in all three countries informed us that they recruit caseworkers across different 
qualifications and work experiences to work with the young unemployed, so our respondents 
represented different professional backgrounds.  
Our research aim to gain insight into the organisational arrangements and procedures for 
policy delivery of activation policies towards young unemployed social benefits recipients, led 
us to the following topics for our interviews:  
 
1) Work-promoting activities for young unemployed persons: a) availability, 
assessments and supervision, b) compulsory activities and exemptions, and c) 
sanctioning of non-commitment.  
 
                                                 




2) Leeway for caseworkers’ professional discretion: a) Their perception of leeway, 2) 
considerations made in individual cases, and 3) Factors influencing their leeway. 
 
Based on a semi-structured interview guide, we invited our respondents to describe and 
exemplify how they carry out their work. Examples from questions were: ‘What assessments 
are made of each person before work-promoting assistance/measures are considered’? ‘How do 
you rate your access to exempt young unemployed from compulsory activities’? And ‘How do 
you perceive your leeway for individual discretion in your work with this group’? 
All interviews lasted about an hour and were carried out in the native language of each 
country. The interviews in Germany and Norway were tape recorded, whilst the interviews in 
the UK were recorded through a combination of stenography and written notes. We transcribed 
our interviews shortly afterwards, exchanged the transcripts of the interviews with each other, 
and deleted the tape recordings.      
 
2.4 Method of analysis 
 
We analyse our data through the legal framework for the three countries. Comparing legal 
framework and job centres’ conduct in three European countries is in many ways challenging. 
The types of financial assistance available for the young unemployed are different in the 
countries, as are the criteria for eligibility. In this paper, we do not aim to present the full picture 
of youth unemployment in the UK, Germany and Norway. However, we aim to show examples 
of contexts for financial assistance and for activating the young unemployed. In addition, we 
aim to describe and compare the different criteria for entitlement, basic criteria (unemployment, 
no/low income) and specific work-related criteria (activities). We have interpreted the 
descriptions from our respondents’ work with the young unemployed in order to show possible 
relevant examples of how they perform their work within the relevant legal framework. On this 
basis, we will discuss both how they are given and how they make use of professional leeway 
and discretion in individual cases. By applying a legal-sociological method,26 our analysis aims 





Comparing different legal systems, their implications and implementation in practice requires 
some hard choices as to which terms we should use to describe certain phenomena.  
Public bodies in charge of social benefits and work-related aid targeted at unemployed 
persons are titled as Jobcentre Plus in the UK, Job Centre in Germany and NAV-office in 
Norway. In this article, we will use the common term ‘job centre’ for all three countries. 
The staff responsible for following up the young unemployed receiving social benefits, 
implementing activation policies and sanctioning in case of non-compliance also have different 
titles in the three countries. While our respondents in the  UK titled themselves ‘work coaches’, 
respondents in Germany used the term ‘personal advisers’ and respondents in Norway 
‘supervisors’. Since we experienced that all our job centre respondents described their work 
through the assessments and decision-making in individual cases, we have decided to use the 
term ‘caseworkers’. 
The caseworkers in the UK and Germany used the term ‘customer’ when referring to the 
individual applying for or receiving social benefits. In Norway the individual is called ‘user’. 
                                                 
26 T. Mathiesen, Retten i samfunnet: en innføring i rettssosiologi (Oslo: Pax, 2011). 
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In this article, we have chosen to use the term ‘claimant’ which in our opinion describes the 
situation when an individual makes a claim for a benefit.  
Another term which will be used in this article is ‘employable’. One understanding of the 
term relates to personal characteristics such as appropriate behaviour, appropriate clothing and 
body hygiene. In context of this research project we choose a broader understanding. The term 
‘employable’ is used here to refer to those young unemployed who, according to eligibility 
terms in each country, are considered capable of working.  
The term ‘universal’ is often used to describe social benefits that are provided for all citizens 
or inhabitants without any eligibility requirements. This term is used slightly differently in this 
research project. We use the term ‘universal social benefit’ when an eligibility requirement or 
criterion becomes so broad that the social benefit comprises a very large number of those in 
need of public assistance. In addition, we also use the term ‘universal’ in relation to activities 
being compulsory for almost all recipients falling under the respective social benefit scheme. 
When reasons for exemptions from compulsory activity are narrow and strict, the activation 
policy applies ‘universally’ for all the respective recipients.  
 In Section five, we discuss which type of social benefit system directed at the young 
unemployed is in line with the human rights to non-discrimination and equality. In this 
discussion we introduce a more specific concept of the right to non-discrimination and the right 
to equality. This concept is termed ‘substantive equality’. To achieve the aim of substantive 
equality, four complementary and interrelated objectives must be pursued. Substantive equality 
is about addressing disadvantages, stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence, facilitating 
participation and accommodating differences, including through structural change.27 For 
example, welfare benefits might address disadvantages, but be delivered in such a way as to 
stigmatise the claimants. In other words, the means employed in the UK, Norway and Germany 
in achieving substantive equality must respect claimants’ differences, avoid stigma and 
stereotyping, facilitate participation, and accommodate differences.  
 
 




In this section, we will present our comparison of the social benefits system and its activation 
policies targeted at the young unemployed in the UK, Germany and Norway, answering the 
first research question regarding what type of legislation and regulations are in place in the UK 
and Germany compared to Norway. Firstly, we examine the countries’ benefits system and 
eligibility criteria for receiving financial assistance and adequate work-promoting activities. 
Secondly, we introduce the agencies responsible for the governing of social benefits and 
activation policies, describing their organisation and mandate and highlighting similarities and 
differences. Thirdly, we compare the UK, Germany and Norway’s legal framework for 
implementing compulsory work activities. Lastly, the reader is presented with the systems’ 
handling of non-compliance with respect to compulsory work-activities.   
 
3.2 Benefits – systems and basic criteria 
 
The UK, Germany and Norway must ensure the individual’s right to social security. This 
obligation is laid down in several international and regional human rights instruments such as 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
                                                 
27 Fredman, ‘Emerging from the Shadows’ (n 13); and Fredman, ‘Substantive Equality Revisited’ (n 13). 
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Article 26 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) for those under the age of 18, 
Article 20 of the International Labour Organization Convention C102 (ILO-C102) on Social 
Security (Minimum Standards), and Articles 12 and 13 of the European Social Charter (ESC).  
In general, there is an understanding that social security consists of two benefits schemes: 
social insurance and social assistance. This type of understanding is prevalent in Article 12 ESC 
on social security schemes and Article 13 on social assistance as the last resort of means, being 
the only human rights instrument that obliges States to provide types of benefits systems. Social 
assistance is defined in Article 13 as the provision of adequate assistance to those without 
adequate resources and who are unable to secure such resources either by their own efforts or 
from other sources, in particular by benefits under a social security scheme. Furthermore, 
Article 14 requires State Parties to promote and provide services which, by using methods of 
social work, would contribute to the welfare and development of both individuals and groups 
in the communities and to their adjustment to the social environment. Neither the ILO-C102 
nor the ICESCR mention social insurance and social assistance in particular. One explanation 
for the ILO-C102 and the ICESCR lacking the aforementioned two types of social security 
benefits schemes might be that it is to be considered a discretion for each State Party on how 
they organise their national security system for those in need. 
Article 9 UN ICESCR and Article 26 UN CRC seem to have a broad understanding of what 
constitutes ‘social security’. Both conventions state that: ‘[t]he states parties to the present 
covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance’ 
including contributory as well as non-contributory social security schemes. The UN CESCR 
Committee states furthermore that the right to social security is ‘of central importance in 
guaranteeing human dignity’.28 
The ECHR is missing a legal norm that obliges State Parties to secure social services and 
benefits. Yet, if a social security scheme exists, a number of social benefits are considered 
protected as possessions under the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the protection of 
property. The ECtHR pointed out that if a State does decide to create benefits, it must do so in 
a manner compatible with Article 14 ECHR on the right to non-discrimination.29 In its Grand 
Chamber decision of 2005 on the admissibility of the case Stec and others v. the UK, the ECtHR 
discussed whether non-contributory social benefits fall under the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1, stated in paragraph 52: ‘.. [..] .. the Court considers that .. [..] .. a right to a non-
contributory benefit falls within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ..[..] ..’.30 In other 
words, the discussion of whether only contributory social benefits fall under the scope of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1 or if non-contributory benefits are also included in the scope of the particular 
human right, was put to rest. It is therefore undoubted that both contributory and non-
contributory social benefits are protected under the ECHR and its Protocol No. 1. Having 
presented the three countries’ human rights obligation to ensure and fulfil social security, we 
now present the national social security systems and benefits relevant for young unemployed 
recipients.  
In the UK, The Welfare Reform Act 2012 (WRA)31 regulates the criteria for Universal Credit 
(UC), a benefit form first introduced to some chosen sites in the UK in October 2014 with the 
aim to make it a universal benefit for unemployed persons throughout England, Scotland and 
Wales. Where implemented, UC replaces former benefits such as Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(unemployment), income-related Employment and Support Allowance (health/disabilities), and 
                                                 
28 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No. 19 on the right to social 
security (art.9)’, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (2008) para. 1.  
29 See further below Section five on the right to non-discrimination and substantive equality. 
30 Stec and others v. the UK, Decision of 6 July 2005, Applications Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01. 
31 Welfare Reform Act (2012), the UK, chapter 5, part 1 Universal Credit. 
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other forms of income support.32 UC is calculated by combining a standard allowance, housing 
costs, particular needs, and costs for children (Section 1 WRA), and has replaced such 
individual benefits. Basic criteria are listed in Section 4 (1) WRA; claimants must be over the 
age of 18 and under State pension age, must be in Great Britain and not receiving education. 
Also, the claimant must have ‘accepted a claimant commitment’ (Section 4 (1) (e)), that is, 
accepted conditions for receiving the benefits. The criteria ‘must be in Great Britain’ mainly 
means that the person must be a legal resident, and not a habitual resident, while ‘[n]ot receiving 
education’ means not undertaking full time course of advanced education or full-time course or 
training for which the person can claim student loan or grant.33  
Universal Credit, as well as a number of other benefits, is subject to a benefit cap, meaning 
that there is a limit on the total amount of benefit.34 The benefit gap was introduced in 2013, 
and comes into effect regardless of family size, housing costs or other circumstances.35 In 2015, 
the UK Supreme Court ruled in a case where the benefits cap was argued to be discriminatory 
and disproportionate by particularly affecting women and single mothers having to escape 
domestic violence. During the case proceedings, the benefit cap was also argued to breach 
children’s basic human rights of sufficient means to meet their basic needs, and the State 
obligation to view all actions and decisions in light of the best interest of the child. Though the 
five judges dissented (3-2), the policy was not overturned by the Supreme Court.36 In a similar 
recent case brought before the Court of Appeal by the Secretary of State for Work and Pension, 
the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment on 15 March 2018 by the majority of two to one 
that the benefit cap was not discriminatory against lone parent families with very young children 
under two years old.37 In the High Court ruling it was held that the application of the revised 
benefit cap to lone parents with children under two amounts to unlawful discrimination and that 
‘real damage’ is being caused to the claimants and families like theirs across the country. Upon 
considering the impact of the benefit cap, Mr Justice Collins concluded that ‘real misery is 
being caused to no good purpose.’38 The Court of Appeal has also taken the very unusual step 
for granting permission to appeal to the Supreme Court against its own judgment.  
In Germany, employable persons lacking sufficient income, their partners and children under 
the age of 15 living in a joint household are eligible to receive unemployment benefits II (UBII), 
Sections 7-9 of the Second Book of the German Social Code 2005 (SGB II). The regular 
maximum duration of the insurance-based unemployment benefit (UBI) is 12 months. UBII is 
the benefit system for the long-term unemployed. The UBII main element is to secure one’s 
livelihood by paying standard benefit in the form of direct cash payments as well as subsidies 
for accommodation and heating, Sections 19-22 SGB II. UBII also covers compulsory social 
insurance contributions, Section 26 SGB II. Eligible for UBII are persons aged between 15 and 
64 who are physically and mentally capable of working for at least 15 hours per week. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court decided in 2010 in a significant case on the question of 
minimum subsistence level under UBII.39 In 2009, The Federal Social Court and the Higher 
Social Court of Hessen submitted three cases to the Federal Constitutional Court, focusing on 
the problem that children under the age of 14 were entitled to only 60 percent of the basic 
                                                 
32 GOV.UK, ‘Universal Credit’. Retrieved 24 September 2018 <https://www.gov.uk/universal-credit>. 
33 Department for Work and Pensions (2013). ‘The Universal Credit Regulations 2013’, Regulations 9 and 12. 
Retrieved 24 September 2018 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2013/9780111531938/contents>  
34 GOV.UK, ‘Benefit cap’. Retrieved 24 September 2018 <https://www.gov.uk/benefit-cap>. 
35 GOV.UK, ‘National introduction of benefit cap begins’. Retrieved 24 September 2018. 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-introduction-of-benefit-cap-begins>. 
36 R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) (Appelants) v. Secretary of State for Work 
and Pension (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 16. 
37 Court of Appeal DA and others v. Secretary of State for Work and Pension [2018] EWCA Civ 504. 
38 DA and others R (On the Application Of) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] EWHC 1446. 
39 The German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 9 February 2010, BverfG, BvL 1/09. 
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provisions, without any definition or ascertainment of children’s needs, or any provisions for 
further groups. The Federal Constitutional Court argued that the UBII legislation, covering the 
standard benefits rates for adults and children, were not in compliance with constitutional law. 
The argument of the Court was based on Article 1 (1) of the German basic law on the State’s 
obligation to protect human dignity read in conjunction with the principle of the social Welfare 
State laid down in Article 20 (1).  The Court stated on grounds of these provisions a fundamental 
right to a guarantee of a dignified minimum existence. Though being considered a landmark 
decision, the court also pointed out that it is the legislator’s discretionary power to decide on 
the level of minimum subsistence. Judicial review is limited to the issues of reasonableness and 
arbitrariness.  
In Norway, a person can be entitled to unemployment benefits under the National Insurance 
Act 1997 (NIA) if s/he has had previous employment, and benefits are calculated from previous 
income. The young employable unemployed receiving contributory social benefits under the 
NIA are obliged to attend work-related activities. Non-compliance is sanctioned with 100 
percent cut of benefits for a period of 12 weeks (NIA, Chapter 4). Unemployed claimants not 
entitled to unemployment benefit and unable to cover their cost of subsistence through work 
income or other means are entitled to social assistance under the Social Services Act 200940 
(SSA), Section 18. Such assistance must be sufficient for the claimant’s basic needs, yet 
restricted in order to maintain his/her motivation for seeking employment (Sections 4 and 18 
SSA). This demonstrates how support for subsistence is reserved for applicants with no other 
means to cover their basic expenses: food, housing, electricity/heating, clothing, medicine and 
other items considered as basic and necessary for the applicant. Financial support under the 
SSA serves as the lower and last safety net, demonstrated through the wording of the criterion 
‘is unable to provide for’ her/himself. According to Section 4, social services must be 
‘justifiable’, meaning that not only must the job centre’s assessments and conduct be proper 
and accountable, but also the measurement of benefits. The legal requirement of justifiability 
within all welfare services were introduced as a result of a decision from the Norwegian 
Supreme Court in 1990,41 stating the individual right to social care of a minimum standard. 
Despite the requirements of justifiable and sufficient measurements of social assistance, the 
level of social assistance has not been adjusted to the same extent as other benefits. Pensions 
under the NIA have over the last ten years increased significantly more than social assistance 
under the SSA.42 
While the UK, through the Universal Credit, has abandoned unemployment benefit based on 
previous income (income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance and income-related Employment 
Support Allowance), Germany and Norway still offer unemployment benefits (UB I, 
respectively Unemployment Benefit NIA, Chapter 4) for a certain period of time based on 
previous income. All three countries still also have social benefits based on the idea that those 
not being able to work due to health problems, parenting, family care or age are eligible for 
social insurance-based benefits.  
The first obvious difference between the social benefit system of the UK, Germany and 
Norway is that the young employable unemployed are defined up to the age of 30 in the 
Norwegian SSA, while the UK and Germany define young employable unemployed up to the 
age of 25. Within the UC regulations in the UK, no differences can be seen between those being 
under or over the age of 25 with regards to eligibility and sanctioning, though claimants under 
25 receive a reduced payment rate.43 The German UBII regulations differentiate between 
                                                 
40 Social Services Act, Norway. 18 December 2009 no. 139. 
41 Rt. 1990 Section 874. 
42 A. Kjønstad, A. Syse and M. Kjelland. Velferdsrett I (Oslo: Gyldendal juridisk, 2017). 




claimants under and over the age of 25 when it comes to the type and length of sanctioning, 
whereas the Norwegian SSA differentiates between those under or over the age of 30 when it 
comes to compulsory activation compared to discretionary activation.  
Another difference we find is between the UK and Germany on the one hand and Norway 
on the other, concerning which claimants are eligible for what type of benefit receipts. In the 
UK, all citizens outside the labour market and education system are covered by UC and the 
claimants must accept a claimant commitment fulfilling work-related requirements. UC thus 
pre-supposes that claimants are capable of working regardless of whether they have had 
previous employment or not. In Germany, all long-term unemployed citizens, whether 
previously employed or not, and considered capable of working at least 15 hours per week, are 
eligible for UBII. It is irrelevant whether the claimant could contribute to the social benefit 
system previously or not. Norway, on the other hand, has a two-fold system dividing the young 
employable unemployed into two groups: claimants covered by NIA-benefits and claimants 
covered by the SSA-benefits. Those young unemployed who have no previous connection to 
the labour market are covered by social assistance according the SSA. Members of both groups 
are classified as unemployed, have not necessarily been previously employed, lack sufficient 
income, are considered employable and have to commit to work-related and work-promoting 
activities. The Norwegian social welfare system differentiates between those eligible according 
to NIA, due to the need of additional medical treatment, and those falling under the ambit of 
SSA.  
In summary, the German and UK systems are characterised by a uniform basic income 
support scheme on the lower level for those capable of work. The Norwegian system 
differentiates between the young employable unemployed, based on either former income or 
health issues eligible for NIA-benefits and those receiving social assistance under SSA-scheme, 
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3.3 Agencies – organization and mandate 
 
In the UK, Germany and Norway, employment agencies are co-organised State- and local job 
centres, managing both unemployment benefits and social assistance, as well as work-related 
assistance to unemployed claimants. In the UK, the local Jobcentre Plus offices are 
administered by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), and their mandate is to provide 
an integrated service incorporating benefits and employment. The agencies are responsible for 
assessing claims for Universal Credit and for supervising claimants in their job searching 
process. In Germany, the national Federal Employment Agency (FEA) and the municipal Social 
Service were merged in 2005. The new agency represents a so-called consortium model and are 
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administered by Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The consortium is the idea of a 
‘one-stop shop’ for delivering employment services to UBII claimants by employees who 
previously worked at municipal social assistance offices as well as employees from local FEA 
offices. However, there was an option for municipalities to apply for a different solution, the 
so-called municipality models, where local offices have taken over the responsibility for 
administering UBII on their own.44 Today, 108 out of 11.054 municipalities existing in 
Germany are so-called ‘optional municipalities’. In Norway, the Work and Welfare Agency 
(NAV) represents a merging in 2006 of stately and local benefit and welfare agencies through 
NIA and SSA, administered by the Department of Work and Welfare.  
Common to the three countries is the claimant interacting with just one office; Jobcentre 
Plus in the UK, Job Centre in Germany and NAV-office in Norway. The internal organisation 
of the agencies shows some differences. In the UK, the merger of benefit administration and 
job-placement services located within the same local office had already happened by the 
introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996.45 This type of merger happened about a decade 
later in Germany, combining the administration of the local social assistance offices and local 
FEA offices; the latter have always been responsible for job-placement activities. Thus, German 
Job Centres consist of employees previously either working with short term unemployed 
receiving social insurance benefits or working with claimants receiving social assistance. The 
role of the German job centres is to co-ordinate integration efforts through the expertise of 
‘personal advisers’ (Section 14 SGB II) in charge of providing overall guidance and job 
placement. However, the responsibility for payment of social benefits is still divided. While 
federal taxes cover the expenditure for benefits and services, municipalities continue to be 
responsible for accommodation and heating.46 The merger of the State agencies of social 
insurance and employment services with local authority social assistance provisions and 
activation measures happened in Norway in 2005. Still, employees responsible for the 
administration of NIA and social insurance-based benefits and services are employed by the 
Norwegian State, while those employees responsible for the administration of SSA are 
employed by their municipality. Social assistance is an expenditure for municipalities financed 
from their available revenues from taxes, block grants, and other general transfers from the 
national government, while social insurance-based benefits are financed by national taxation.47  
To summarise, in all three countries, benefits and casework is administered in locally run 
branches, under governmental agencies. However, in Germany some municipalities are granted 








                                                 
44 J. Clasen and A. Goerne, ‘Germany: Ambivalent Activation’, in: A. Moreira and I. Lødemel (eds), Activation 
or Workfare? Governance and the Neo-Liberal Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 172-202 at 
180. 
45 J. Griggs, A. Hammond and R. Walker, ‘Activation for All – Welfare Reform in The United Kingdom, 1995-
2009’, in: A. Moreira and I. Lødemel (eds), Activation or Workfare? Governance and the Neo-Liberal 
Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 73-100. Job Seekers’ Allowance merged social insurance 
and social assistance benefits for unemployed claimants.  
46 Clasen and Goerne, ‘Germany’ (n 44). 
47 E. Gubrium, I. Harsløf and I. Lødemel, ‘Norwegian Activation Reform on a Wave of Wider Welfare State 
Change’, in: A. Moreira and I. Lødemel (eds), Activation or Workfare? Governance and the Neo-Liberal 
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3.4 Compulsory work-related activities 
 
Article 20 of the ILO-Convention C102 on Social Security (Minimum Standards), and Articles 
12 and 13 of the ESC provide legal grounds for imposing activities on the benefit recipients. 
The term ‘activities’ can be either suitable employment or other forms of activities aiming to 
qualify for and lead to suitable employment. The wording implies that any duty imposed on the 
unemployed to receive social security is legitimate only if constituting or leading to ‘suitable 
employment’.48   
In the UK, eligibility for UC is conditional upon the claimants complying with different 
areas of work-related activities. Claimants must commit to participation in work-focused 
interviews and work preparation.49 UC claimants must also commit to work searching and work 
availability.50 
Claimants can be subject to only one or some requirements, or be exempt from requirements 
due to e.g. limited capability or heavy caring responsibilities (Sections 19-21). UCR Regulation 
16 also states such exemptions when ‘there are exceptional circumstances’ which would make 
such commitment ‘unreasonable’. The activities are to be stated in a ‘Claimant’s Commitment’ 
document, making up a full week of activities. A claimant who finds part-time work will be 
obliged to actively search for work in the remaining hours to make up a full week. 
In Germany, eligibility for UBII requires active job searching and commitment to 
participating in welfare-to-work programmes. The rights and duties of the claimant of UBII in 
the activation process are set out in so-called ‘integration agreements’ (SGB II, Section 15). 
The overall goal of the UBII is to ‘demand and promote’ (‘Fordern und Fördern’), as is the first 
Article’s title of the SGBII. The various measures of active labour market policy are laid down 
in the Third Book of the German Code of Social Law on employment promotion (SGB III). 
Which activities are required depends on the caseworker’s professional discretion and leeway.51 
Welfare-to-work programmes and activities can comprise the instrument of ‘work 
opportunities’ or short training courses. Further training comprises a more substantial human 
capital investment and focuses on the adaption of occupation-specific skills to recent labour 
market developments. Other programmes can be wage subsidies, start-up grants and job 
placement services of private companies.52 According to Section 10 (1) SGBII, a UB II recipient 
                                                 
48 T. Eidsvaag, ‘Arbeidslinjen og menneskerettighetene’, Retfærd 39 (153:2) (2016) 45-57. 
49 Welfare Reform Act (2012) (n 31), Sections 15-16. 
50 Ibid, Sections 17-18. 
51 Clasen and Goerne, ‘Germany’ (n 44).  
52 M. Huber, M. Lechner, T. Walter and C. Wunsch, ‘Do German Welfare-to-Work Programmes Reduce Welfare 
Dependency and Increase Employment? German Economic Review 12(2) (2010) 182-204. 
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can be exempt from work-related or work-promoting activities. The reason for exemption can 
be due to limited physical or mental capability, caring responsibilities for children under the 
age of three or caring for elderly family members. Other exceptional circumstances can also be 
considered by the caseworker. 
In Norway, unemployment benefits under the system of NIA require that the claimant, 
regardless of age, is a legitimate job seeker, ‘willing to take’ ‘any paid job’, ‘anywhere in 
Norway’, ‘full time or part time’ and ‘to participate in work-promoting measures’. Claimants 
must further register as active job seekers and report to NAV fortnightly, or more frequently if 
required by the job centre. Social assistance under the system of SSA also requires compulsory 
activities as a main rule, but merely for claimants under the age of 30.53 In the law proposal, the 
Labour and Welfare Department states that individual assessments and considerations must be 
carried out regarding which activities will be adequate for strengthening the claimant’s chances 
of obtaining work.54 The Department further describes the activities to be both ‘low threshold’ 
for claimants with work as a long-term but vague goal, and work-related activities for claimants 
needing to maintain their work ability while searching for work. 
Claimants can be exempt if  ‘weighty reasons’ justify such an exemption.55 The Labour and 
Welfare Department describes the term ‘weighty reasons’ as reasons due to the claimant’s 
characteristics or situation, leading activities to be considered inappropriate or unrealistic at the 
time of decision. However, it is emphasised that the access for exemption is narrow.56 
In summary, unemployed claimants in all three countries are required to participate in some 
kind of work-promoting activity. Grounds for exemption from compulsory activities are 
relatively similar in the three countries. However, while the British UC and German UBII 
regulations explicitly state adequate reasons for not imposing work-related activities, Section 
20A of the Norwegian SSA only states that exemption must be due to ‘weighty reasons’. In 
order to reach justified individual decisions for imposing – or exempting – compulsory 









































                                                 
53 SSA, Section 20A. 
54 Norwegian Government Law proposal. Prop. 13 L (2016-2017) Changes in the Social Services Act, National 
Insurance Act and Others (compulsory activities for young recipients of social assistance), para. 2.4.2. 
55 Supra note 53. 
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3.5 Sanctioning of non-compliance 
 
Whilst Norway has ratified the ILO-Convention C168 on Employment Promotion and 
Protection against Unemployment, Germany and the United Kingdom have not. ILO-
Convention C168 Article 20 (f) states that reduction in social security payment can be made 
when the receiver without just cause has failed to attend placement, vocational guidance, 
training, retraining or redeployment in suitable work. Article 21 no. 1 furthermore states that 
benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if the receiver refuses to accept suitable employment. 
Yet, it is important to notice that Article 21 no. 2 lays down considerations necessary to be 
made by the Norwegian authorities when assessing whether an employment is suitable or not. 
Sanctioning a receiver of social security when activities or work are not considered to be 
‘suitable’, could mean a violation of the individual’s right to social security.  
In the UK, UC claimants ‘for no good reason’ failing to comply with work-related 
requirements and conditions, can be sanctioned through a reduction in their benefits.57 
Sanctioning must follow set procedures, as described by the Department for Work and 
Pensions:58  1) Referral from the Job Centre, based on documentation and claimant information, 
to the ‘the decision maker’, i.e. Central office; 2) Information, including the claimant’s reasons 
being weighed up; then 3) Decision-making. If sanctioning is decided, the claimant is given 
written notification. The claimant can ask the department for a reconsideration of the sanction. 
If a sanction is upheld, the claimant can appeal to an independent tribunal. Claimants subjected 
to reductions can claim ‘hardship payments’, i.e. a reduced amount of the UC.59 Hardship 
payment requires individual assessments, showing that the claimant is unable to pay for 
immediate basic needs such as housing, heating and food. The claimant must also demonstrate 
reduced spending and attempts to secure alternative funding, as well as demonstrate that he 
complies with his commitments during the period of hardship payment. Hardship payment is to 
be reimbursed in rates. In Germany, if the caseworker detects non-compliance of the UBII 
recipient, the welfare agency is required to impose a sanction by benefit revocation (SGB II, 
Secstinos 31-32). Boockmann et al., however, describe discretion at the agency level with 
regard to whether a sanction is actually imposed or not.60 The sanction regime distinguishes 
between breach of a duty of conduct and breach of a duty of compulsory registration and 
participation. Breach of a duty of conduct relates to participation in any activities aiming to 
support (re)integration to the labour market. Breach of a duty of compulsory registration and 
participation relates to registering as jobseeker and participating by attending meetings at the 
job centre or medical appointments. Sanctions for breach of a duty of conduct related to 
attendance in work-related activities are harsher for claimants under the age of 25. First absence 
triggers the elimination of social assistance entirely for a period of three months (SGB II, 
                                                 
57 Welfare Reform Act (2012) (n 31) Sections 26-27, Section 11(j). 
58 Department for Work and Pensions (2017). ‘Universal Credit Sanctions Experimental Official Statistics’. 
Retrieved 24 September 2018 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/613873/universal-credit-
sanctions-statistics-background-information-and-methodology.pdf>. 
59 Welfare Reform Act (2012) (n 31) Sections 28 and 56. 
60 B. Boockmann, S.L. Thomsen and T. Walter, ‘Intensifying the use of benefits sanctions: an effective tool to 
increase employment?’, IZA Journal of Labour Policy 3(21) (2014) 1-19.  
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Section 20).61 Housing and heating is paid directly to the landlord during this period (SGB II, 
Section 31 (3)). The caseworker has the discretion to decrease this period to six weeks in special 
circumstances (SGB II, Section 31 (b) (1)). A second failure to comply within a year will result 
in a total cancellation of payments, including for housing and heating (SGB II, Section 31(a) 
(1). The personal adviser can revise this decision if the claimant is willing to follow up the 
requirements immediately. Sanctions regarding the duty of compulsory registration and 
participation are sanctioned less strictly. A breach is sanctioned by a reduction of 10 percent of 
UBII, regardless the age of the claimants. The German system allows caseworkers to provide 
additional support if the sanction is a reduction of more than 30 percent of UBII allowances 
(SGB II Section 31(a) (3) (1)). It can only be provided to those who have fallen under the 
minimum subsistence due to sanction cuts.62 The additional support consists of benefits either 
in kind or of a pecuniary type, such as food stamps. The Social Court of Gotha initiated a 
preliminary ruling procedure before the Federal Constitutional Court in June 2015, suggesting 
that penalty deductions from UBII violated fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. 
The Social Court based its questions to the Federal Constitutional Court on the constitutional 
right to human dignity (German Basic Law, Article 1 (1)), the right to physical integrity 
(German Basic Law, Article 2 (2)), and the freedom to choose an occupation (German Basic 
Law, Article 12).63 However, instead of deciding on the compatibility of penalty deductions 
with these constitutional norms, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled the preliminary 
proceedings to be inadmissible on the grounds of procedural failures by the Social Court of 
Gotha, and thus avoided a substantial decision on penalty deductions.64 
In Norway, claimants receiving unemployment benefit under the system of NIA and ‘for no 
good reason’ failing to report to NAV as required, or who are no longer considered a ‘legitimate 
job seeker’, lose their right to benefits (NIA, Sections 4-8 and 4-21). For social assistance under 
the system of SSA, sanctioning requires that NAV in writing has informed the claimant about 
the possibility of such a sanction and can be immediately effectuated by the agency (SSA, 
Section 20A). According to the legislative proposals,65 NAV must take into account both the 
claimant’s reasons for non-compliance and the possible consequences of a benefit reduction, 
and the reduction cannot bring benefits below what is reasonable for the claimants’ immediate 
basic needs (SSA, Section 4). Non-compliance cannot be sanctioned by total elimination of 
social assistance since claimants unable to provide for themselves, are entitled a minimum base 
of living costs (SSA, Sections 18 (1) and 4). NAV can therefore reduce the benefit, but not 
lower than for minimum basic needs. Such minimum benefits are not generally subject to 
reimbursement to NAV. 
In summary, legislation in all three countries empowers the authorities to sanction claimants 
by reducing or cancelling benefits for non-compliance with compulsory work-related activities. 
However, the procedures for sanctioning are different. In Germany and Norway, sanctioning 
can be decided and implemented by the Job Centre/NAV-office directly, whereas in the UK, 
the Jobcentre plus must refer the case to the Central Office for a decision to be made. This 
procedure also gives the claimant the right to contradict, as well as to have his/her case 
reconsidered and even appealed.  
                                                 
61 Sanctions for those over the age of 25, SGBII Section 31ff: Penalty deductions of 30 percent, and then 60 percent 
and ultimately 100 percent. Sanctions by penalty deductions last for at least three months. No discretion is left to 
the caseworker.  
62 See also The German Federal Constitutional Court, Judgment of 9 February 2010, BverfG, 1 BvL 1/09 on a 
guarantee of a minimum subsistence level.  
63 The Social Court of Gotha, Preliminary Ruling Procedure of 4 June 2015, S 15 AS 5157/14. 
64 The German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 6 May 2016, BverfG, 1 BvL 7/15. 
65 Norwegian Government Law proposal: Prop. 39L (2014-2015). Changes in the Work Environment Act and the 
Social Services Act, 129. 
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The sanctioned claimant’s right to minimum subsistence is similarly present in the three 
countries’ legislation. One clear difference here is that in order to receive hardship payments in 
the UK, the claimant must prove that he has tried alternative funding. Hardship payments are 
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3.6 The rule of law as framework for professional discretion 
 
Caseworkers implement national and international legal norms on social benefits by applying 
professional discretion. The exercise of professional discretion involves making individual 
considerations in cases where the solution to a problem is not pre-described in regulations. The 
rule of law plays an important role in ensuring that professional discretion and leeway is tailored 
in a way to support and ensure that a decision is sound.  
One part of the rule of law is the requirement of a legal basis for State interference in private 
life. Article 8 ECHR states that people’s private lives are to be free from ‘interference by a 
public authority’, except when such interference is ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’. Thus, labour and welfare authorities must have statutory authority to 
make decisions regarding benefits and work-promoting activities for the unemployed. This 
entails that statutory norms on social benefits and work-promoting activities should be designed 
in a way so as not to leave too much to professional discretion. Otherwise, the predictability of 
authorities’ decision-making is weakened, bearing the risk of less accountable decisions, as well 
as the risk that interfering in the individual’s private life might not be in accordance with the 
law.    
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Article 14 of the ESC states that Contracting Parties ‘undertake to promote or provide 
services, which by using methods of social work, would contribute to the welfare and 
development of both individuals and groups in the community…’. This means social security 
systems being established in line with social work methods. The International Federation of 
Social Workers has given this global definition of social work: 
 
Social work is a practice-based profession and an academic discipline that promotes 
social change and development, social cohesion, and the empowerment and 
liberation of people. Principles of social justice, human rights, collective 
responsibility and respect for diversities are central to social work.  Underpinned 
by theories of social work, social sciences, humanities and indigenous knowledges, 
social work engages people and structures to address life challenges and enhance 
wellbeing.66  
 
In addition, when applying professional discretion, it is paramount that public authorities 
follow procedural rules to avoid any misuse of authority and to ensure sound administrative 
practice. The procedural framework all three countries are obliged to implement is found in 
Article 6 ECHR. This human rights norm is intended to ensure the fulfilment of procedural 
rights within the justice and administrative system of State Parties. In its case law, the ECtHR 
has determined that social benefits fall under the scope of Article 6.67 Thus, every social benefit 
claimant is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by authorities managing 
social benefits. The right to fair and public hearing within a reasonable time is interpreted as 
the obligation of States to have in place and to follow procedural norms in decision-making. To 
fulfil the legal obligation of imposing conditions for work related activities which are adequate 
for each individual claimant, it is vital that professional discretion is based on thoroughly 
assessed information, based on the situation as experienced by the claimant as well as other 
sources.  
A well-established procedural rule important in relation to professional discretion is the 
explanation of ‘how the decision-making authority reached its decision’.68 The particular 
outcome of a decision on social benefits and work-related activities must be transparent and 
testable for the claimant.  
The rule of law also requires that decisions made by authorities must aim at achieving 
substantive equality, meaning that every individual’s case is to be treated individually and by 
that ensuring equal treatment before the law. This rule of law is expressed by Article 7 of The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stating that ‘[a]ll are equal before the law’. 
Thus, each person represents his/her own case: needs, resources, opinions and wishes. Applying 
statutory norms with summary and discretionary criteria allows and demands professionals 
making judgements based on considered reasoning, in individual cases. 
Bearing in mind the human rights obligation regarding procedural norms and using methods 
of social work in public decision-making, in the following, caseworkers’ leeway when using 
profession discretion in UK, Germany and Norway will be presented. 
 
 
                                                 
66 International Federation of Social Work (2014). ‘Global Definition of Social Work’. Retrieved 24 September 
2018 <https://www.ifsw.org/what-is-social-work/global-definition-of-social-work/>. 
67 Deumeland vs. Germany, Judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A No 99; Feldbrugge vs. Netherlands, Judgment of 
29 May 1986, Series A No 100. 








Having presented and compared the legal frameworks of the UK, Germany and Norway, the 
aim of this section is to present and compare the findings from the interviews we conducted in 
The UK, Germany and Norway. We will answer the second research question on how 
caseworkers in the UK, Germany and Norway experience the legal framework for the 
governance of activation. The main aim is to investigate caseworkers’ professional conduct and 
leeway for professional discretion in individual cases. We examine the scope of professional 
discretion with regard to the type of activation and sanction by non-compliance. 
 
4.2 Caseworkers’ leeway for professional discretion in individual cases 
 
4.2.1 The caseworkers’ main work goal and main areas of professional discretion 
Asked about their main work goal, respondents from all three countries described a strong focus 
on getting claimants into the work force. The UK respondents spoke of employment as a sole 
objective, and all pointed out that commitment to active job seeking and taking any job, full-
time/part-time or short-term, was paramount. Asked about when and how they used their 
professional discretion, they all linked this solely to matching jobs and people, though some 
respondents also stressed their use of discretion in tailoring claimants’ commitments for each 
person. However, the majority of their examples of using professional discretion described their 
individual assessments on whether and how to sanction non-compliance with compulsory 
activities. According to the German respondents, their focus was not exclusively employment; 
they also highlighted working to support entrance to or the completion of education, as well as 
apprenticeships. They described their main areas of professional discretion to be linked to what 
type of activity was adequate for the individual claimant, depending on whether employment 
was a short-term or long-term goal. The Norwegian respondents also spoke of a strong focus 
on employment, but also demonstrated differentiation between employment as a short-term 
goal or a long-term goal for their claimants. They described the facilitation of work-promoting 
activities for the unemployed as their main mandate, although they expressed concern for 
persons who they considered to be ‘far from labour market’ due to social problems. 
 
4.2.2 The characteristics of the claimants 
Asked about what factors influenced their leeway for professional discretion, all caseworkers 
stressed how work-promoting activities and commitments must be tailored to suit individuals 
with different and complex problem areas.  
The UK respondents were consistent in saying that although their claimants as a main rule 
were to comply with work-promoting activities, they had to focus on the ones that failed to 
comply. According to one respondent: ‘often some of the claimant’s “baggage” or needs do not 
appear during the first assessment, and sometimes the claimant will present to have more 
obstacles than he/she really does’. Many respondents used the term ‘mismatch between 
commitment and performance’, when describing situations where claimants failed to comply. 
Such situations were exemplified: ‘some of our claimants have baggage, such as mental health 
issues, domestic violence, homelessness, drug abuse et cetera’, and ‘some need work experience 
of any kind, training, to gain self-confidence’. 
One German respondent exemplified how commitments must serve concrete purposes for 
the claimant by describing a claimant needing financial support one month before commencing 
studies. Rather than starting a random activity, he could receive UBII unconditionally. 
However, if the claimant would profit from attending a qualifying course before commencing 
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studies, UBII would be conditioned on attendance of this course. The Norwegian respondents 
all spoke of the necessity of proper assessments, e.g. ‘so I might think a case looks easy; all this 
person needs is a job. But I might be unaware that there is more to him than we know, more 
than he wants to tell us. That will often lead to wrongful decisions, too little help and too much 
pressure on the person, leading to counter-productive results’. 
For claimants regarded as being ‘far from’ employment due to mental issues and social 
problems, respondents stressed that they must take individual steps closely related to the 
claimant. On the other hand, as exemplified by a German respondent: ‘working with ordinary 
customers requires us to follow certain standards, also because there are much higher 
expectations towards this type of claimant. If the “ordinary” customer does not fulfil the 
standards, he or she will meet certain consequences’.  
 
4.2.3 The characteristics of the caseworkers 
Several UK respondents pointed out that ‘we are not social workers’ and the job centre ‘is not 
social services’. They illustrated their statement with examples like ‘the Job Centre’s work is 
to match jobs and people’ and ‘other agencies have other responsibilities, ours is to help people 
find sustainable work’. They consistently stressed that they all should work in the same ways. 
Two respondents described how they in their recruitment interviews at Jobcentre Plus had been 
asked ‘why do you think you can be a work coach?’, and several others pointed out that though 
they had different backgrounds, they had undergone ‘the same in-house training’. According to 
one respondent, ‘the diversity amongst us makes us able to meet each person in a diverse group 
of job seekers’. Another respondent described: ‘we were called work advisors before, now we 
are work coaches – and coaching is our main skill, along with labour market skills, community 
service knowledge and people skills’. Also, one stated, whilst other respondents nodded, that 
‘we find that the legislation is “looser” than we aim to be. The law only requires steps of work 
search, but that is too little and too general’. One respondent added: ‘our guidance is much more 
intensified so that we can give them the tools they need to turn their own life around’. The UK 
respondents also emphasised how the labour market largely influences their professional 
discretion, e.g.: ‘jobs are outsourced, manual jobs are done by computers’, and ‘“John Doe” 
can no longer expect to find work at the local factory’.  
One German respondent described how: ‘there are colleagues that are acting close to 
legal frameworks and norms, because these provide safety, and there are colleagues who want 
to find out how far they can stretch the scope of professional discretion’. This respondent 
described herself/himself as a ‘rubber band’, but underlined that: ‘in the end there are clear legal 
conditions framing what we can do, and which not even I can bend. For example, when a 
customer no longer can receive benefits under the scheme of UBII, then I lose competence and 
jurisdiction over his or her case. Something I find a pity.’ Another respondent pointed out that 
‘legal regulations always lead to the question of how to apply these legal regulations’ and that 
‘I can choose not to impose consequences on the young claimant, until we perhaps in the fifth 
week or so start sanctioning. I have that choice, so I need to have an idea from the start as to 
how I am to handle this case’.  
One Norwegian respondent stated: ‘I experience endless room for professional leeway, due 
to my experience in this job. I know that if I can justify my decisions, nobody can criticize me’.  
He/she added that ‘for a supervisor with less experience and more insecurity, the room for such 
leeway will be tighter and you will end up forcing claimants unjustifiably because you do what 
others tell you’. The Norwegian respondents also stressed the importance of decisions based on 
discussions between staff, e.g: ‘we may have an idea in our office that some of us are “mild” 
and others “strict”, so perhaps our differences may be offset through discussions’. The 




Sometimes, if colleagues say that “this claim is a definite no”, and I start writing the 
decision, but something tells me that this is just wrong, to deny this claim. Then I turn the 
case and start all over again, using my knowledge of the case and the law, but this requires 
courage from me. 
 
4.2.5 The organising of the job centre 
The German and Norwegian respondents described how their leeway for professional discretion 
is influenced by how the municipality chooses to organise the job centre. One German 
respondent working at a job centre within an ‘optional municipality’ explained how those 
working in job centres co-organised with FEA are ‘I’d say; less independent. They have rather 
a lot of influence from outside, and all in all everything follows what the FEA demands’. 
According to this respondent, the job centre has less leeway for developing projects tailored to 
local situations and challenges. However, he/she also pointed out that being a merged FEA and 
Job Centre, the caseworkers at job centres are ‘more integrated and networked with the FEA. 
Working at one agency, I can much more easily pick up the phone and discuss a case and 
possible ways of work integration with a colleague from the FEA. That is not possible if you 
are not in the same agency’.  
One Norwegian respondent described: ‘our agency is organised on a principle of building 
blocks, where we only address the blocks that we think are necessary in each case. It is difficult 
to cut a block by suggesting more individual solutions’, and ‘we are constantly being 
reorganised, for example from working with only one group of claimants to having to work 
with all groups’. Another respondent stressed how ‘it is quite frustrating to hand over a decision 
that I have thoroughly assessed, and then it is returned with criticism on small details’.  The 
first respondent said that ‘I do not think my leeway seems very wide considering that the 
claimants in my team are considered to be relatively close to getting work’, but also added: ‘for 
persons needing assessments regarding their health situation or housing help, we can consider 
postponing their compulsory activities’. Both respondents described how their ideal was to use 
their knowledge and their co-operation with their claimant, but their ideals were restricted by 
agency instructions and internal cultures like ‘that is how we do it here’, internal ‘hear-say’ 
from colleagues and ‘we do not have the mandate to make the final decisions in the cases we 
have assessed’. They also described how ‘internal instructions are restricting the claimant’s 
entitlement’ and ‘my professional discretion’, whereas one respondent pointed out that ‘if 
granting a claim will bring the person closer to employment, my leeway is wider’. The other 
respondent explained how ‘I have often discussed cases where colleagues state that the claim 
is a clear “no”. Then I start assessing, and I get this gut feeling – based on the case information 
and the law – that it is not right to decline this claim’.  
 
4.2.6 Discussion 
To summarise, the caseworkers in all three countries described how they are influenced by 1) 
the characteristics of their claimants; 2) the characteristics of the caseworkers; 3) the organising 
of the agency; and 4) the legal framework.  
To grant young unemployed persons a just and informed assessment and decision process as 
described in human rights instruments, it is important that sufficient attention is given to their 
individual characteristics, resources and needs, as required by the rule of law laid down in 
Article 6 ECHR, Article 14 ESC and the Article 7 UDHR. Although the UK respondents 
pointed out that the Job Centre is not the Social Services, respondents from all three countries 
have described that their young claimants show several and somewhat complex challenges to 
be dealt with before they can be employed. They have also brought forward how caseworkers’ 
characteristics can influence how they perceive how wide or narrow their leeway for individual 
discretion is. Personal discretion can lead to a decision of a rather broad understanding of legal 
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regulations in order to reach the young person and to increase the chance of employment in the 
long run. Caseworkers have expressed that working in co-organised local and federal job 
centres restricts their professional leeway, through policy norms, through having to work with 
all claimant groups and by internal agency instructions. These findings show the importance of 
securing that caseworkers working with the young unemployed have sufficient 
knowledge/skills, time and professional leeway – within agencies with sufficient focus on this 
target group. 
The UK Work First approach focuses on that unemployed people should take on any job as 
quickly as possible, ‘reflecting the idea that the best way to succeed in the labour market is to 
join it’. 69 Researchers point out that although the approach focuses on work in light of social 
and economic benefits, it is ‘less concerned with the initial job outcomes produced by 
employability policies’. Research is showing that this focus on ‘any job’ is not providing 
sustainable employment, and that people are moving in and out of precarious employment.70  
The Norwegian workfare policy as a political management tool implies that the benefit systems 
are to be tailored in ways that stimulate the citizens to work rather than being supported by 
social benefits.71 Research shows variable success of whether this approach aids more people 
into sustainable work. What is suggested by research is that adequate activation does lead to 
entering the work marked, but the question remains whether it leads to employment which is 
sustainable.72 The Norwegian labour market is described as performing well in quantity, quality 
and inclusiveness dimension. The job quality is understood in terms of pay, security, working 
environment and the inclusiveness dimension points to income equality, gender equality and 
employment access for disadvantaged groups. However, men still earn 35 percent more than 
women in work, and 9 percent of the working-age population live on less than 50 percent of the 
median equalised household disposal income.73 This rather positive description of the 
Norwegian labour market should suggest that those entering the work market find sustainable 
work. In part this might be correct, but research also presents evidence that this is not the 
outcome for some groups in society. In particular, the aim of integrating groups of immigrants 
and women into sustainable work is challenging.74 It seems possible to suggest that finding 
adequate activities for the young unemployed increases the possibility of sustainable work. 
Researchers have also pointed out, however, that the system of compulsory activities for social 
benefit recipients bears the risk of the young unemployed being forced into activities that do 
not promote their transition into work, in order to avoid sanctioning.75 
                                                 
69 C.D. Lindsay, R.W. McQuaid and M. Dutton, ‘New approaches to employability in the UK: combining Human 
Capital Development and Work First strategies?’, Journal of Social Policy (2007) 539-560 at 541. 
70 The Conversation. ‘Welcome to Britain: a land where jobs may be plentiful but are more and more precarious’ 
(21 November 2017). Retrieved 24 September 2018 <https://theconversation.com/welcome-to-britain-a-land-
where-jobs-may-be-plentiful-but-are-more-and-more-precarious-87423>. 
71 S. Stjernø and E. Øverbye, ‘Arbeidsmotivasjon, arbeidslinje og velferdsstat’, in: S. Stjernø and E. Øverbye (eds), 
Arbeidslinja - Arbeidsmotivasjonen og velferdsstaten (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2012) 15-26. 
72 E.S. Dahl and I.A.E. Lima, ‘Krav om å stå opp om morra’n – Virker det?’, Arbeid og Velferd 3 (2016) 115-130; 
Ø. Hernæs, S. Markussen and K. Røed, ‘Can welfare conditionality combat high school dropout?’, IZA Discussion 
paper No 9644 (2016) 1-44. 
73 OECD, ‘How does Norway Compare – Employment Outlook 2017’ (2017). Retrieved 24 September 2018 
<http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook-2017_empl_outlook-2017-en>. 
74 F. Bakken, ‘Det kjønnsdelte arbeidsmarkedet i Norge’, Arbeid og Velferd 4 (2009) 79-86; H. Aune, 
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arbeidsmarkedet’, NTNU Samfunnsforskning Mangfold og inkludering (2012) 1-46. 
75 A. Hagelund, E. Øverbye, A. Hatland and L.I. Terum, ‘Sanctions – the night side of the Work Line approach’, 
Tidsskrift for velferdsforskning 1(19) (2016) 24-43; Supra (n 3). 
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Germany’s welfare-to-work programmes, introduced alongside UBII, have the primary 
objective of (re)integrating welfare claimants into the labour market as quickly as possible and 
to reduce welfare dependencies.76 Research on the effectiveness of the German welfare-to-work 
programmes with regard to attaining sustainable work does not unambiguously conclude one 
way or the other. It depends on various factors. Bockmann, Thomsen and Walter point out that 
not all groups of claimants are supported alike. For example, women are much less supported 
in these programmes than men, which in turn leads to different outcomes for sustainable 
employment.77 Huber, Lechner, Walter and Wunsch conclude that short training does have a 
significantly positive effect on self-sufficient employment, yet, it depends on the type of group 
receiving this type of training. One-Euro-Jobs, considered to be short training, is positive and 
shows weakly significant employment effects for men who are not lone parents and who are 
not migrants. These One-Euro-Jobs are temporary, part-time jobs. They take place in the public 
and non-profit sector, are in the public’s interest and should not compete with regular jobs. 
Participants are not paid a wage but receive their welfare benefit plus one to two euros per hour 
worked.78 Short, but also continuous training are effective for young participants and non-
migrants, while short training also shows positive employment effects on the elderly and people 
with small children.79 
Although there is a wide consensus that work and self-provision are major values for the 
individual and the society as a whole, it is important to recognise that some individuals face 
more challenges in their transition to work. For those individuals, it is imperative that the 
authorities fulfil their human rights obligations of supporting the unemployed into employment 
and of securing their basic needs for subsistence. For work to be a real value rather than only 
an ideal one, we emphasise the importance of sustainable work, which is described by 
Eurofound as ‘achieving living and working conditions that support people in engaging and 
remaining in work throughout an extended working life’. Eurofound also stresses that ‘[t]he 
challenge is to match the needs and abilities of the individual with the quality of jobs on offer’.80 
With this background, it is imperative that the young unemployed are not being shuttled 
between jobs that have no or insufficient purpose towards sustainable employment, or else 
being sanctioned. 
 
4.3 Sanctioning of con-compliance – motivation or punitive remedy?  
 
As said in Section 3.5, only Norway is bound by international treaty Articles 20 (f) and 21 no. 
1 and no. 2 ILO C168. These norms allow States to refuse, withdraw, suspend or reduce social 
benefits when non-compliance with conditions occurs, but the conditions must be ‘suitable’ for 
allowing such sanctioning. In the following, the use of sanctioning by caseworkers of the UK, 
Germany and Norway will be presented and compared to each other.  
 
4.3.1 Types of compulsory commitments 
Asked what activities the agencies would make compulsory for the young unemployed, our 
respondents had different descriptions and examples.  
The UK respondents all emphasised job searching as the main compulsory commitment for 
their claimants. One respondent described how ‘looking for work is a full time job’, another 
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how ‘we focus more on evidence, our customers must demonstrate their work search process’.  
The respondents described how commitments could also be of a more personal kind, in order 
to enable introduction to an employer at any time and at short notice. One respondent 
exemplified such commitments as; ‘I will dress smart, have clean hands and finger nails’ and 
‘I will not smell of alcohol/weed when I attend the Job Centre’. The respondents further 
explained how claimants’ commitments are written as ‘I will’-sentences, e.g. ‘I will apply for 
all jobs that meet my qualifications’.  
The German job centre staff described the ‘integration contract’ as the basis for co-operation 
between the caseworker and the claimant. One respondent underlined the importance of 
removing any pressure from this contract; otherwise, the claimant would be gone. Yet, the idea 
is that every claimant ‘is doing something’. Another respondent pointed out that ‘if I should tell 
you all kinds of activities, we would sit here the entire day’. 
The Norwegian respondents listed the activities for the unemployed under 30 to be 
mandatory attendance at the NAV-office, in order to be assessed, supervised and assisted into 
short-term or long-term work. Asked about duration, they replied ‘until they get a job’, or ‘until 
placed in a different work-promoting measure’.81 They also stressed that the range of other 
work-promoting activities to choose between was restricted, especially for persons who needed 
more customised activities because of special needs, and persons who had tried and failed at 
the skills required for such activities.  
The UK and Norwegian respondents emphasised the importance of mandatory and active 
use of the agencies’ job-search websites. The UK respondents described the website Universal 
Job Match, for job seekers to present their CV, apply for jobs, record their work-related 
activities and communicate with their caseworker, e.g. ‘because everything on the site is 
recorded, and we can monitor and check the claimant’s activities and compare them to their 
Claimants’ Commitment’. The Norwegian respondents focused on how the NAV website could 
also give claimants ‘necessary information about rights and duties without appointments’ with 
the agency, as well as representing a platform for digital communication between the claimant 
and the caseworker. The German respondents did not mention the Job Centre’s job-search 
websites or any platform for digital communication, which might be due to respondents 
exemplifying their work mainly through cases where the young unemployed were rather ‘far 
from’ employability.  
 
4.3.2 Challenges of claimants’ commitments 
All respondents described that supporting and/or imposing activities on their young claimants 
represented some challenges.  
One UK respondent described how ‘sometimes we see a mismatch between the claimant’s 
commitment and performance, and then we need to find out what is stopping him’. Another 
respondent, who described different kinds of ‘baggage’ in claimants, pointed out how ‘we need 
to help them move forward by bringing in help from other service providers, charities, and 
voluntary services. How can they step forward in their work progress, with their problems?’ 
Another UK respondent expressed concerns regarding how ‘sanctions might damage life skills 
and confidence’. One respondent emphasised how ‘making up each person’s claimant 
commitment takes openness and honesty, trust and confidence. Otherwise the person might just 
disappear off the rack’, while one added ‘others have so many obstacles that their claimant 
commitment must be very small steps. But still steps and still commitment’. 
The German respondents pointed out that some of their claimants are relatively or very far 
away from the ordinary labour market, e.g.: ‘even though we work in a labour market-oriented 
way, not a social work oriented, someone like me is acting and working within a huge scope’. 
                                                 
81 Relevant social benefits then could be health based. Either Work Assessment Allowance, see NIA Chapter 11, 
or a social benefit for those not being able to work ever, disability benefits, NIA Chapter 12. 
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One respondent stressed: ‘we have extremely many here with mental illnesses, and you can 
really see that they are becoming younger and younger’. They also described constant 
discussions regarding whether the policy of mandatory activities with sanctions is an effective 
method. One respondent expressed compulsion towards claimants with mental health problems 
as ‘a stillbirth’. Another respondent talked about how the young claimant ‘needs to be picked 
up where he or she is, and taken along in a manageable tempo, in the direction he or she wants 
the most’. He/she also stressed how: ‘we are working with young people with no banister’.  
The Norwegian respondents described how the young persons’ challenges are mainly mental 
health issues, lack of self-confidence due to dropping out of school and previous lack of coping 
in their adolescence. According to one respondent, ‘when you have to make him try an activity 
and experience that it does not work for him because it is far too challenging and more 
assessments are needed, then we are restricted regarding which activities can be adequate for 
assessing the person better’. They also expressed concerns about the young claimants’ lives if 
they cannot cope with compulsory activities and therefore lose their benefits and contact with 
NAV. The need for targeted assessment in such cases is illustrated from both respondents, as 
explained by one: ‘you must have knowledge about consequences of ailments like mental health 
problems or drug abuse, also about what services this office can offer, the labour market and 
the requirements of working life’.  
 
4.3.3 Situations and process for sanctioning non-compliance 
UK caseworkers stated that they must consider sanctions for all claimants not demonstrating 
evidence of performance of compulsory activities. As exemplified by one: ‘this person here, he 
has presented a hand-written note over two pages, with very general activities, “asked around 
for work, checked my CV, and applied for seven jobs”. It is nowhere near the 35 hours of 
activities I had assessed him as capable of’. According to the German respondents, claimants 
not complying can be sanctioned for several months, e.g. ‘since they are not fulfilling the offers 
we make’. The Norwegian respondents described sanctioning as easier towards the claimants 
complying with daily attendance at their internal course, e.g. ‘So it is easy to detect when they 
are missing. They always get a chance with me, but repeated unreasoned absence will be 
sanctioned’.  
Regarding the process of sanctioning, respondents in the different countries had different 
descriptions. In UK, one caseworker emphasised how ‘we must refer the case to the Central 
Office’.  Asked whether the claimant is able to challenge a referral, one respondent states, ‘Yes, 
our referrals are very factual, we describe what contact has taken place, the claimant’s 
commitment, what he has done or not and his given reasons. The Central Office will inform 
him/her of our referral and ask his views, then assess the case and sanction or not’.  In Germany, 
sanctions are imposed by the caseworker responsible for designing the ‘integration contract’.  
The respondents described how they are sometimes fascinated when claimants do not return 
and protest against loss of benefits, and assume that the young person is supported by family 
and friends, e.g.: ‘then, I always say: Eating spaghetti at grandma’s.’ The Norwegian NAV-
office also has the mandate to make the decision and impose the sanction directly, e.g. ‘because 
we have informed them that that will be the consequence’. According to one respondent, ‘Once 
we stop their money, they come back here anyway. And if they don’t, we assume they do not 
need our assistance’. 
Asked whether the person’s basic needs would be secured after sanctioning, the respondents 
described different regimes. The UK respondents stated that claimants applying for hardship 
payment ‘must first demonstrate that he has tried to find what he needs, free of charge’, and 
that ‘he must try to live somewhere for free, use food banks etc.’. In addition to this, ‘He will 
still have to demonstrate that he complies with his commitment, 35 hours a week’. According 
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to the Norwegian respondents, claimants ‘must still be able to survive’. One respondent still 
describes how the caseworkers are challenged:  
 
The law says that if you can prove that you have no money, regardless why, then you 
are entitled “crisis assistance”. But within this office there is an internal rule saying 
that we do not grant crisis assistance “just like that”. However, if a claimant appeals 
our decision, we know that it will be overruled.  
 
4.3.4 Discussion 
In all three countries, the legal justification for imposing sanctions for non-compliance is the 
idea of activities promoting and passivity inhibiting transition to employment. Sanctioning can 
be somewhat mitigated by emergency benefits, to secure a minimum survival for the individual. 
However, the UK respondent who stated that ‘sanctions might damage life skills and 
confidence’ highlights the dilemma that the construction of compulsory demands and 
sanctioning indeed runs the risk of counter-productive decisions, bringing the claimant further 
away from work life. This dilemma has been highlighted in research, showing that sanctions 
can introduce new disincentives to work, as well as having a severe impact on the individual.82 
A person being sanctioned for non-compliance through loss of benefits is still subject to the 
human rights of minimum subsistence.83 In all three countries, national legislation secures a 
minimum of existence for its citizens, by providing emergency benefits. Thus, it is reasonable 
to ask how a comprehensive or full reduction of a benefit defined in statutory law as minimum 
would not amount to a violation of the fundamental right to minimum subsistence. In relation 
to Germany, one might also ask how benefits in kind or food stamps relate to the fundamental 
right to private life in the meaning of developing one’s personality. Furthermore, relating to all 
three countries, how is the idea of a minimally dignified existence, including the ability to 
maintain interpersonal relationships and a minimum of participation in social, cultural and 
political life secured?84 The idea of social citizenship is contradicted by hardship payment, 
benefit in kind and emergency payments and as Lembke states: ‘[p]enalty deductions negate 
the very idea of a fundamental right to (dignified socio-economic) minimum subsistence and 
the paradigmatic shift from paternalist welfare to social citizenship’.85  
The respondents’ descriptions and reflections have shown some areas which can both 
promote and inhibit young unemployed persons’ (re-)entrance to work, as well as areas where 
the persons’ human rights can be at risk. We will enhance five such areas:  
 
1) While the Job Centre’s websites represent a platform for information and efficient job search 
for the claimants, it also represents a form of surveillance. This calls for clear policies regarding 
boundaries between expedient and inexpedient surveillance. Using websites as a contact point 
between welfare agencies and individuals who can be considered vulnerable due to health 
related and/or social problems also represents challenges. It requires that all claimants have 
access to computers and the internet, and also knowledge of and skills in how to use such 
websites. An obvious question to be asked is therefore whether such websites serve the 
surveillance interest of the authorities rather than the legal security interest of the individual.  
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2) The wording ‘I will’ in UK claimants’ commitments gives the impression that the claimant 
has made a choice, which can obscure the fact that commitments are laid down in laws and are 
therefore imposed on the person. The ‘integration agreement’ in Germany is voluntary, meaning 
the caseworker cannot force the claimant to enter this agreement. This might not be obvious for 
the claimant being simultaneously informed about sanction regime.  
 
3) Our respondents stress how they are dealing with claimants with several types of problem, 
where mental health is a factor described by all. Commitments to show evidence of sufficiently 
active job searching illustrates the need of sufficient numbers of vacant and adequate jobs, a 
factor outside the claimants’ control. The Norwegian respondents also express the lack of 
sufficient and adequate work-promoting activities. Still, the legal requirement to comply with 
activities is imposed on the individuals, with the possible risk of inhibiting their (re)-entrance 
to the labour market.  
 
4) The German and Norwegian systems for sanctioning being imposed by NAV/Job Centre 
directly after claimant’s failure can be seen as less suited to safeguarding the person's legal 
rights than the UK system of the job centre referring a sanctioning case to the Central Office. 
Here, the claimant can challenge the decision at both the referring job centre and the Central 
Office. On the other hand, the system of referral also bears the risk of the caseworkers 
distancing themselves from the claimant and the sanctioning decision, whilst the decision is 
made by staff who do not know the claimant. However, regardless of how the sanctioning 
process is performed, we still stress the importance of recognising that sanctions represent loss 
of basic income and therefore cause hardship to the individuals. 
 
5) For a sanctioned person to be secured absolute basic needs for survival, UK respondents 
stated that they must prove that they have tried to find accommodation and food for free – 
meaning they have to ask for charity. Not only is this a stigmatising system for persons who 
have no other means of income, but the respondents state that they still have to comply with 
their 35 hour-a-week commitment. Norwegian respondents describe that the NAV-system 
restricts a sanctioned persons’ legal rights to minimum assistance, through the agency’s 
‘internal routines’. The question in relation to benefit in kind and pecuniary benefits like food 
stamps is whether it is in line with the fundamental right to private life understood as personal 
freedom and the possibility of experiencing social citizenship.  
Another aspect to discuss is whether conditionality and sanctioning is the proper tool for 
promoting sustainable employment. Youth Unemployment Statistics for UK (2018) show – 
after excluding young people in full education – a decrease in the number of unemployed young 
people aged 16-24, and an increase in the number of young people not in work and not looking 
for work.86 In a UK study on welfare sanctions and conditionality, the authors conclude that 
although such regimes seem to reduce benefit use, there is cause for concern regarding 
increasing numbers of persons being excluded from benefits also becoming excluded from both 
work and welfare.87 In a survey performed by the Trussel Trust, a UK National anti-poverty 
charity in charge of more than 425 foodbanks, the authors express concern about the well-
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established relationship between sanctioning and increased foodbank use.88 The report also 
shows that one third of respondents experienced difficulties meeting their claimant 
commitments, and one fifth were affected by sanctioning. Economy was reported as a key 
reason for claimants not meeting their conditions, due to them not being able to afford the 
expenses of bus fares to attend meetings or internet to fulfil the requirement of 35 hours a week 
activity on the Universal Jobmatch website. 
Research studies from Germany address various consequences for those claimants subjected 
to sanctions.89 A study based on 30 interviews with claimants states that sanctions often have a 
crippling effect on the claimants, and that only in rather few cases does claimant show 
adaptability.90 Similarly, other studies talk about claimants, especially those under the age of 
25, stopping any contact with the job centre.91 Other consequences found in these and other 
studies are increased experience of social exclusion, increased debt, increased moving of 
housing, increased experience of shame linked to use of food stamps, increased hunger, and the 
experience of deterioration of physical and psychological health.92 
In Norway, the new regime of universal compulsory activities for social assistance claimants 
only came into effect in January 2017. However, the social agencies had for decades had the 
discretional power to impose such activities, though this power had been variably effectuated.93 
In a study based on data for the period of 1994-2004, the effects of social agencies increasing 
their discretional power to impose conditions were evaluated.94 The analysis shows that the 
number of social assistance recipients was reduced, and that the work-related activity conditions 
for young people had had a particular impact. Still, the author argues that the new universal 
regime might be less effective than the previous system of discretional power, based on the 
caseworkers’ information of each person, to decide whether to impose conditions, and who to 
give such conditions. Finally, he suggests that the new regime of universal compulsory 
activities will have less effect than an increased use of discretional individual decisions. The 
need for professional discretion based on the individual’s needs and resources to prevent 
claimants being excluded both from work and from welfare has also been discussed by other 
researchers.95 
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Admittedly, our research aim has evolved through the course of learning about and analysing 
similarities and differences between the social benefits systems of UK, Germany and Norway. 
We started by asking ourselves which type of organisation of social benefit systems serves and 
best attains the goals of entering the ordinary labour market. As legal researchers, we formed 
our question in the light of non-discrimination and equality law. Is it fruitful to include a large 
part of the unemployed within one social benefit scheme and activation policy, as to some extent 
UC in UK and UBII in Germany do, or is it fruitful to differentiate between various groups of 
unemployed, as in Norway, in order to bridge the gap from unemployment to employment? Our 
third research question regarding which type of social benefit system for the young unemployed 
leads to substantive equality in line with the human rights to non-discrimination and equality is 
discussed in the following sub-sections.  
 
5.2 The right to substantive equality 
 
The right to substantive equality contributes to the process of the inclusion of minorities in 
mainstream society. Non-discriminatory social benefits schemes ensure substantive equality 
when transforming historical and structural hindrances, redressing disadvantage and addressing 
power structures, providing non-stigmatising access to adequate social benefits for individuals 
and groups of individuals.96  
Since all three countries are State Parties to the ECHR and the ECtHR has developed case 
law on the question of non-discrimination in relation to social benefits, it is reasonable to expect 
that the following analysis of the UK, Germany and Norway’s social benefit systems targeted 
at young employable unemployed is based on the Convention and the Court’s case law. The 
European judiciary, both national and European courts, are granting the legislator a wide margin 
of appreciation and discretion when it comes to policy choices in relation to general measures 
of economic or social strategy, such as welfare benefits.97 The judiciary, thus, will generally 
respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation’.98  
However, we choose to discuss the three system’s adequacy for achieving substantive equality 
for this specific group in society in light of the four dimensions of substantive equality as 
developed by Sandra Fredman.99 As we discuss whether the conditionality and sanctioning of 
non-compliance is supporting the aim of substantive equality, we will point out, through 
examples of national and international court cases, the pitfalls if one or more of these 
dimensions are not adequately considered by the courts. We will also provide examples of a 
variety of legal practices supporting the argument that judges have been aware of these 
dimensions and have been ruling in line with them. In this respect, we point out that we will not 
conclude firmly whether one or several countries are in breach of the right to non-discrimination 
read in conjunction with the right to social security. Our aim is to analyse the three countries’ 
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social benefit system for the young employable unemployed in light of the claimants’ right to 
substantive equality. 
 
5.3 Redressing disadvantage - Redistributive dimension 
 
5.3.1 A disadvantaged group of claimants 
Young employable, yet unemployed, persons applying for UC, UBII and SSA are often among 
those living in poverty and social exclusion. There is much knowledge about the possible 
reasons for why young people are dropping out of education, either at the secondary or higher 
level, or do not learn any skills, let alone apply for jobs.100 The main findings on possible 
reasons are: 1) poor school presentations early in a pupil’s life; 2) the background of the pupil, 
such as ethnicity, class and gender; and 3) the identification and engagement of the pupil’s 
home with educational system.101 On a more individual level, Norwegian researchers point to: 
1) lack of motivation for education and work; 2) neglect in their upbringing; 3) lack of 
friendship and poor social network; and 4) psychological health problems.102 We presuppose 
that these individual factors are relevant reasons for the unemployment of young people also in 
the UK and Germany.  
 
5.3.2. Universally applicable 
The detrimental effects of belonging to a group of low social-economic status, belonging to an 
ethnic minority group, having a certain gender and being brought up in a neglecting home are 
not targeted directly by the legal norms of UC, UBII and SSA. However, as Sen has put it: 
‘[w]hat people can achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social 
powers and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and 
cultivation of initiatives’.103  
None of the legal norms are explicitly targeting any of the known disadvantages many of the 
young unemployed are struggling with. There is a lack of affirmative action that would advance 
substantive equality. The structure of UC, UBII and SSA is universally applicable to all young 
claimants. All young unemployed receiving benefits under these schemes must fulfil activities, 
with only very narrow exceptions. This approach, admittedly, provides equal opportunity for 
the young person to enter the labour market. However, it does not recognise how, due to social, 
economic, physical or psychological constraints, it may not be feasible for this person to achieve 
the goals.104 A system that appears nearly universal may have disparate impact (often referred 
to as indirect discrimination).  
That universal conditionality and sanctioning can have as a consequence that individuals or 
groups are treated alike which should have been treated differently because their status and 
situation is different, is acknowledged also in jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In the case 
Thlimmenos v. Greece in 2000, the Court stated that: ‘[t]he right not to be discriminated against 
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in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States 
without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose 
situations are significantly different.’105  
 
5.3.3 Equal opportunity to choose your life path 
Equality of opportunity emphasises that once opportunities are made available, each individual 
can choose her or his own life course. This understanding is visible within the British, German 
and Norwegian systems by using individual agreements as a means of implying that the 
claimant can choose her or his future path.106 Yet, besides strict exemptions, little in the legal 
norms of UC, UBII or SSA shows consideration of the fact that the young person’s previous 
life experiences might make her or him unable to meet the requirements attached to her or his 
chosen path.  
The policy of benefit cap, introduced in the UK, is an example of the opportunity to enter 
the labour market with support from the UC system, motivated by having a higher income than 
benefits once you have entered the labour market. Yet, this social policy and its legal norms fail 
to see that lone parents with young children under the age of two years still will not find it easier 
to take on paid work.107 As a consequence of the benefit cap for these lone parent-families, they 
have to live on low benefits and stay marginalised in poverty. The equal opportunity approach 
provides these parents with the choice to take up activities which lead them to enter the labour 
market, but does not address the constraints that are faced by lone parents with young children. 
The equal treatment of all UC claimants has a disparate impact on these lone parents and their 
children. The policy of benefit cap fails both to address the disadvantages due to lack of child 
care these lone parents are facing, and to support either an exception or adjustment for this 
group of claimants.  
The majority of the UK Court of Appeal in the case of DA and others v. the Secretary of 
State for Work and Pension recognised the disparate impact on lone parents with young 
children. However, the Court then used the pattern of discriminatory law asking whether this 
disparate impact can be justified. Since only social policies which are ‘manifestly without 
reasonable foundation’ are considered to be discriminatory, and the Court of Appeal did not 
find evidence of that, the State won its appeal. Furthermore, the Court’s majority accepted the 
State’s argument that this group of lone parents can choose to work. It also agreed with the 
State that these lone parents with young children are not worse off getting a job than lone parents 
with older children, which then often have several children, too. The right to substantive 
equality does not support the idea of freedom of choice regardless of the circumstances; it takes 
the circumstances on board to redress the disadvantages. The right to substantive equality does 
not even require the comparison with another group which is also struggling and by that 
levelling down those that are better off, in this case lone parents with older children which are 
in child care or even school.108 If the Court would have analysed this case by asking if the social 
policy of a benefit cap is readdressing the disadvantage of lone parents with young children, it 
might have come to a different conclusion in this case. This point of view could be seen by the 
reasoning of Judge Lady Hale in her minority opinion in the Supreme Court case R (on the 
application of SG and others) v. Secretary of State regarding the question of whether the benefit 
cap is discriminatory against lone female parents. Lady Hale held that: ‘…the major aim, of 
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incentivising work and changing the benefits culture, has little force in the context of lone 
parents, whatever the age of their children.’109 She acknowledged the circumstances and context 
of lone parents addressing the benefit cap’s failure to redress their disadvantages, and on the 
contrary adding to their existing constraints.  
It is crucial to recognise that the young unemployed make decisions in a way that one might 
find problematic. We often adapt our choices to our circumstances.110 One can hear the 
argument that those not choosing to enter an agreement with the caseworker have this freedom 
of choice, and can choose not to apply for the benefit of UC, UBII or SSA. The freedom of 
choice is also often used to excuse the experience of being sanctioned for non-compliance: not 
fulfilling the obligations you agreed to is your own choice, and you have to live with the 
consequences of being sanctioned. These arguments do not take into account the power 
imbalance between the claimant and the system presented by the caseworker when agreements 
are entered.111 Neither does the freedom of choice argument take into account the circumstances 
and context in which young claimants agree to specific activities.  
In a different area of welfare policy, namely public education, but on the same questionable 
matter of choice, the ECtHR in DH v. Czech Republic carefully scrutinised the claims that the 
situation the applicants finds themselves in is a result of their own choice. In this case, the State 
argued that there was no breach of Article 14 ECHR, since the Roma parents had agreed to 
separate education. The Court’s Grand Chamber, however, dismissed this argument by the 
State, assessing voice and agency in the light of power imbalance between the public authorities 
and the Roma parents.112  
Redressing the disadvantages of the young claimants must thus recognise that providing a 
range of choices on types of activities, or having the choice not to apply for UC, UBII or SA, 
being provided with the possibility to enter an agreement or commitment, is not addressing the 
disadvantage attached to the circumstances the young person might actually find herself in. This 
is even more the case when choices and agreements are linked to sanctions. The threat of being 
sanctioned when not complying with the conditions agreed upon will in general increase the 
constraints for the young unemployed. This is even more so, once the young person is failing 
to comply and is sanctioned. The power structure underlying the system of sanctioning is 
excluding the young unemployed from participating in determining their actions.113 
 
5.3.4 Leeway and discretion for caseworkers 
The legal system of UC, UBII and SA provide leeway for professional discretion by the 
caseworker. Examples from our interviews with caseworkers in the UK, Germany and Norway 
have shown that some of their professional practice is aimed at redressing the disadvantages of 
the young unemployed. Some caseworkers call the claimant in the morning, making sure she 
gets up on time, and some also use social media to stay connected with the young unemployed 
using their form of communication. Other examples show a more streamlined approach 
focusing on entering the labour market as a sole aim of the caseworker’s task.  
Respondents in the UK expressed a more rigid conception of what are adequate and suitable 
activities for the young unemployed under the ambit of UC, where the paramount focus is 
employment and job-seeking. The German respondents described a variety of activities for 
entering the work market, including education or apprenticeship. Norwegian staff demonstrated 
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differentiation between employment as a short-term goal or a long-term goal for their claimants 
putting weight on social problems some claimants might have.  
It may seem that the UK system bears a higher risk of treating their claimants in a completely 
identical manner, not allowing necessary leeway to support the individual with targeted and 
suitable activities. Without sufficient data to conclude firmly this way, we can still point out 
that all three countries are obliged to support the individual with suitable activities and work. 
Though human rights provisions like Article 20  ILO-Convention C102 and Article 20  of the 
European Code on Social Security legitimate imposing sanctions on claimants not fulfilling 
their activity requirements or when refusing to take suitable work, sanctioning can indeed 
become illegitimate when activity and work is not ‘suitable’. Also, EU policy requires that the 
UK and Germany are providing suitable activities and work. Principle 4 of the European Pillar 
of Social Rights states that individuals have the right to ‘timely and tailor-made assistance to 
improve employment or self-employment prospects’ (Principle 4, first paragraph). 
There is no clear evidence that a universal system like the UK one, or a nearly universal 
system like the one in Germany, per se leads to non-differentiated treatment where 
differentiation is necessary. However, universal systems might lead to more conformity in types 
of activities and work offered. Adequacy, quality, accountable assessments, suitable activities 
and work might get lost on the way.  
The wording in Section 20A of the Norwegian SSA stating young claimants’ obligation to 
fulfil compulsory activities in order to receive social assistance is held in general and universal 
applicable terms. However, the legislator in the preparatory work leading to Section 20A SSA 
pointed out that caseworkers must use their discretionary power when evaluating the 
employability of the young unemployed and, based on that, consider what type of activity is 
adequate to propose for the young claimant.114 Those being rather far away from the ordinary 
labour market need other types of activities than those being fairly near a possible employment. 
Despite the common aim of work, the legislator in the preparatory work acknowledged that 
requirements for the claimant must be adjusted to the claimant’s situation. Unfortunately, this 
is not expressed in the wording of Section 20A SSA, which gives reason to ask whether 
caseworkers are expected to read legal preparatory papers given by the government.  
Norwegian respondents describe the young employable unemployed under the SSA as 
having a high incidence of mental health issues, lack of self-confidence due to dropping out of 
school and previous lack of coping in their adolescence. When preparing the legal norm, the 
legislator seems to adjust to this fact by not placing overly strict requirements on this group in 
the preparatory papers. Yet, the wording of Section 20A SSA is strict in its requirements. The 
section does require that claimants attend the imposed work-promoting activities, unless 
weighty circumstances apply.  
 According to our respondents in all three countries, they apply individual and professional 
discretion regarding what type of activity was promoted for the young unemployed. The 
characteristics of their claimants, whether they were ‘close to’ or ‘far from’ entering ordinary 
work, influenced the choice of activity imposed. The individual is treated individually, in order 
to accommodate difference in all three countries. This implies that the accommodation of 
differences is possible in any type of social benefit scheme that allows for professional 
discretion with regard to finding adequate activities for the individual.  
The discretionary power provided for in the three systems is the single factor that can ensure 
an approach to conditionality and sanctioning, and as such redress the disadvantages many 
young claimants are struggling with. However, the caseworkers are not in the position to change 
the power structures imposed on the claimant by the systems per se. The caseworkers might 
even find themselves embedded in power structures they cannot avoid. In addition, some of the 
                                                 
114 Norwegian Government law proposal, Prop. 39 L (2014-2015). Changes in the Work Environment Act and the 
Social Services Act, para. 6.6.2.  
35 
 
constraints experienced by the young unemployed have their roots and causes in previous 
experiences which the caseworker cannot redress at the time the young unemployed is entering 
the system of either UC, UBII or SA. Caseworkers in job centres hold different qualifications 
and skills, which also represents a risk that both assessments and decisions in each claimant’s 
case can be based on more or less arbitrary conditions. 
 
5.4 Redressing stigma, stereotyping, and prejudice – Recognition dimension 
 
5.4.1 Recognition wrongs 
According to Fredman, this dimension of substantive equality speaks to our basic humanity. 
She states that: ‘[e]quality attaches to all individuals, not because of their merit, or their 
rationality, or their citizenship or membership of any particular group, but because of their 
humanity’.115 The right to substantive equality aims to specify the wrong to be addressed as 
stigma, stereotyping and prejudice.  
The second dimension of the right to substantive equality is referred to as the recognition 
dimension. Instead of talking about human dignity as an open-ended and rather vague 
conception, Fredman argues that the right to substantive equality must address ‘recognition 
wrongs’.116 ‘Recognition wrongs’ is a concept developed by Nancy Fraser expressing the 
inequality in the mutual respect and concern that people feel for one another in society.117 
In a case regarding violence against women, the ECtHR drew attention to the recognition 
dimension, making visible the ways in which stigma, stereotypes and prejudice against women 
can lead the authorities to refuse to recognise the victims as worthy of State protection and to 
the passive or active condoning of perpetrators’ actions.118 Applying the recognition dimension, 
the ECtHR has in several cases also required structural change regarding same-sex civil 
partnership.119 The Court has for example stressed ‘the instrinsic value for the applicants’ for  
which the recognition of civil partnerships would provide.120 Fredman points out that the Court 
has recognised the ways in which stigma and prejudice have implications in relation to 
disadvantage and social and political exclusion.121 
 
5.4.2 Stereotyping and prejudice of claimants  
Previous research has shown that individuals receiving social benefits and the related fear of or 
experience of poverty, describe shame as a psychosocial dimension in their lives. Poverty 
related shame is imposed by the attitudes and behaviour of those not in poverty, framed by 
public discourse and influenced by the objectives and implementation of anti-poverty policy 
leading to stigma.122 Gubrium and Lødemel state that the social assistance claimants they spoke 
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with in Norway consider the fact that social assistance is the last resort option and that it is 
calculated carefully as a source of considerable shaming.123  
We argue that unemployed persons receiving social assistance in Norway experience a 
greater burden based on stress, stigma and shame than those who fall under unemployment 
benefits within the NIA. Based on that premise, the following assumption can be made: rather 
universal benefit schemes, like the UC and UBII, comply with the recognition dimension by 
including a large number of unemployed persons under the same social benefit scheme and by 
that avoiding a hierarchy among claimants of various social benefits. The experience of ‘we are 
all in the same boat’ might counteract stigma, stereotyping and prejudice.  
However, there are signs of persisting stigma and stereotyping prevailing in the way society 
interacts with claimants of UC and UBII. One example is the agreements which some UK 
respondents describe that claimants must sign. These rather personal commitments, stating for 
example ‘I will dress smart’ or ‘I will have clean hands and finger nails’ appear, in our point of 
view, as shaming UC claimants.124 The social policy of a benefit cap in the UK also has an 
element of stereotyping and prejudice. The policy was explained by the British Government by 
stating that: ‘[w]ithin the cap, there is a very clear incentive for people to work,  ..[..].. ensuring 
claimants know they are better off in work than on benefits.’125 We find that this explanation 
implies that claimants of UC are not sufficiently willing or motivated to work. The majority of 
the Supreme Court in the case R (on the application of SG and others) v. Secretary of State for 
Work and Pension contributed to this prejudice against and stereotyping of unemployed by 
acknowledging this being a legitimate aim for the social policy of benefit cap.126  
Similar implicit shaming is also visible in Section 20A of the Norwegian SSA. The legislator 
explained and defended the introduction of compulsory activities for the young unemployed 
under the age of 30 by pointing out a few job centres that had implemented a compulsory 
activity scheme and could show an increasing success rate of work integration.127 The success 
of these job centres is explained by the municipalities’ great effort in establishing and running 
adequate and suitable activities for young social assistance claimants.128 It is therefore fair to 
ask why this legal norm on activity is not formulated as an obligation for the job centres to 
provide adequate, suitable activities and accountable assessments of claimants in their 
responsible area, rather than as an obligation for the claimant to fulfil an activity. The legal 
norm is formed as an obligation for the young claimant implies that she or he is unwilling to 
work and therefore must be forced to do so. This stereotyping could have been avoided by the 
legislator. Regarding all three countries’ social benefit systems discussed here, they link labour 
market support and benefit eligibility tightly to job search conditionality, thereby stressing an 
obligation on the part of jobseekers rather than on public authorities supporting the individual 
in finding suitable work.  
In the design of UC, UBII and Section 20A SSA there is a rather strong element of stereotyping 
and reinforcing prejudice against those unemployed claiming social benefit support. The UN 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has underlined that State Parties must pay 
full respect to the principle of human dignity to avoid any adverse effect on the form in which 
benefits are provided.129 The Norwegian social assistance system under the SSA, with its 
universal individual duty of committing to imposed work-related activity, can raise and confirm 
stereotypes of the ‘lazy young people on benefits’, and can as such heighten already existing 
stigma and humiliation. In UK, the practice of requiring UC claimants to sign commitments 
written as ‘I will’-sentences, e.g. ‘I will apply for all jobs that meet my qualifications’ or ‘I will 
dress smart’, ‘have clean hands and finger nails’, ‘I will not smell of alcohol/weed when I attend 
the Job Centre’, witness a paternalistic treatment of adults. Also, sanctioned claimants were 
required to demonstrate the use of food banks and other charities in order to be entitled hardship 
money. We consider this shaming and by that an action that violates the human dignity of the 
claimant. Germany’s UB II claimants are urged to sign ‘integration agreements’, giving the 
impression of a choice with regard to activation policies. We agree with other authors that it is 
questionable that pressuring claimants to reach State-defined goals concerning employment are 
in line with the principle of human dignity meaning that human beings must not be treated as 
objects of the State.130 We reformulate this, however, by stating that the design and 
implementation of the three countries’ social benefit scheme do not fulfil the right to substantive 
equality, not acknowledging that these systems must address the recognition dimension. At the 
moment, recognition of shaming, stereotyping and existing prejudice is not only lacking at the 
governmental level, the legislator, in some implementation practices, but also at the judicial 
level, as some cases from the UK illustrate.  
 
5.5 Participation dimension 
 
5.5.1 The importance of community and social inclusion 
The participation dimension addresses both the lack of political voice and the importance of 
community and social inclusion in the life of individuals. The lack of political voice must be 
compensated for by equality laws, both to compensate for this absence of political voice and to 
open up the channels for greater participation in the future. Related to this policy and political 
level, one can find this part of the participative dimension in Article 4 (3) of the UN Convention 
on the Protection of Rights of persons with Disabilities requiring State Parties to closely consult 
with and actively involve persons with disabilities’ in the development and implementation of 
legislation and policies relating to disability.  
The importance of community in the life of individuals is recognised by the right to 
substantive equality when addressing that individuals are essentially social. To be fully human 
includes the concept of social inclusion, meaning that there must be active measures to integrate 
individuals into society.131 The aim is to counteract a rather universal, abstract understanding 
of the individual and by that, counteract formal equality. An example for an approach where 
individuals must be integrated in society and their community is visible in Article 12 of the UN 
CRC on the child’s right to participation. This article requires State Parties to assure the child 
and children the right to express their own views freely. A prerequisite is that the child is 
capable of forming his or her views. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has stressed 
that to form a view or views requires the child to be informed about the matters affecting his or 
her life.132 Thus, the participative dimension regarding social inclusion of the child entails to 
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receive adequate information in order to be able to develop an opinion or view in addition to 
facilitating free expression of these its opinion or view. 
With regard to social security, the German Federal Constitutional Court has used the 
principle of human dignity to found a fundamental right to minimum subsistence.133 The Court 
did underline that the content of the minimum subsistence is not understood as merely the 
sustenance of physical existence, but also the possibility of social relationships and participation 
in cultural and political life.134 This understanding of the Court reflects an understanding of 
social rights as claims to inclusion into society’s life.135 
In relation to the young unemployed, we discuss if the three countries’ social benefit systems 
are supporting social inclusion of young unemployed. 
 
5.5.2 Active labour market policies and social inclusion 
The human right to work as laid down in Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights provides that ‘everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection of unemployment’. The right to work includes 
the free choice of employment. In previous publications, active labour market policies with 
compulsory and coercive elements of activation are discussed in the light of the right to freely 
choose employment.136 As Freedland, Craig, Jacqueson and Kountouris point out: ‘that the 
principle [the freedom to work] is not a very powerfully protective one….the jobseeker…can 
be asked to accept any sort of job offer immediately available on the market, or face the loss or 
curtailment of social security entitlements.’137  
The three countries’ approach regarding compulsory activities and sanctioning non-
compliance can be described as an offer, yet it has the character of an order. We have found 
few legitimate reason for refusing activities offered by the job centre. Thus, though we agree 
that society can ask for contributions, nearly universal compulsory activities and the threat of 
sanctions have the risk of being punitive and as such will favour social exclusion and isolation, 
rather than social inclusion and participation.138  
We are also of the opinion that the coercive elements in the UC, UBII and Section 20A SSA 
decrease the element of participation by narrowing the freedom of the young unemployed to 
choose their professional and vocational path. Many young unemployed are without a realistic 
choice due to lack of education or previous career. Yet, the effect of decreased choice and 
participation might lead to a lack of full realisation of the young unemployed’s personality.139 
This is even more the case if those activities offered to the young unemployed are not long-
term vocational education and training programmes, but rather subsidised or job creation 
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schemes.140 Training programmes in Germany, for example, consist of short-term courses often 
used in a highly standardised manner, and by that are undercutting the young unemployed’s 
possibility of participation and choice regarding activities.141 In our opinion, this increases 
rather than decreases the risk of social exclusion of young persons in the long run. The aim of 
social inclusion through entering the labour market based on long-term vocational education 
and training is threatened.  
 
 
5.6 Transformative dimension 
 
5.6.1 Accommodating differences 
The ECtHR has in Thlimmenos v. Greece in 2000 recognised that the right to non-
discrimination according to Article 14 ECHR is violated ‘…when States without an objective 
and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons who’s situations are significantly 
different.’142 Individuals or groups must, in other words, be treated differently because their 
status and situation is different.  
Similar to this understanding is the content of the transformative dimension of the right to 
substantive equality. This dimension recognises that equality is not necessarily about sameness 
and that different identities and characteristics should be respected. What should not be 
respected is the detriment which is attached to difference.143 The transformative dimension has 
the aim to respect and accommodate difference, removing the detriment but not the difference 
itself. According to Fredman, this means that existing social structures must be changed to 
accommodate difference, rather than requiring member of out-groups to conform to the 
dominant norm.144  
 
5.6.2 Changing social structures 
There are, as we see it, no signs of UC, UBII and Section 20A SSA contributing to change of 
social structures related to the young unemployed. On the contrary, the universal approach to 
activation, the focus on short-term training and fast track to employment and the sanctioning of 
non-compliance is lacking the accommodation of differences between the various groups of 
unemployed and within the group of young unemployed.  
As we have shown, whether a young unemployed person is met with an understanding for 
her or his individual identity and characteristics depends on the use of professional discretion 
by the caseworker. The caseworker and the claimant are, however, in all three countries still 
situated in a structure and system where the transition to employment is the sole aim. The 
claimant has to train for and adjust to the labour market and its requirements, rather than the 
labour market and society at large adjusting to the aspects of identity attached to the young 
unemployed. There are some differences as to how much leeway and professional discretion 
caseworkers have. With regard to our respondents, the Norwegian case workers seem to have 
the most leeway, whilst the UK caseworkers seem to have the least. The overall impression, 
however, is that the legal framework governing social policy implementation towards young 
unemployed, does not aim to bring about a structural change supporting the young unemployed 
to enter labour market.  
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Considering the question of which type of social benefit system for the young employable 
unemployed supports the right to substantive equality, we find challenges in all three countries 
discussed. Substantive equality entails redressing disadvantage, addressing stigma, 
stereotyping, prejudice and violence, as well as facilitating participation and accommodating 
differences, including through structural changes.145 Firstly, some descriptions of how 
claimants are treated individually and in general by legal rules, such as personal commitments 
which must be entered, do in our opinion support the experience of stigma, stereotyping and 
shame. Secondly, when activation and work-promotion is the paramount aim of caseworkers, 
one can ask whether UB II and UC as well as Section 20a SSA provide enough leeway for 
accommodating for differences between the young unemployed. Thirdly, compulsory 
activation and the harsh penalising sanctioning system represents the counterpart to facilitating 
participation, and by that represents a paternalistic system rather than a system securing social 
citizenship.   
 
 
6. Concluding Observations 
 
The duty to provide for oneself, as described in the ESC, must be understood and applied within 
a social context. Compulsory activities as mandatory for receiving basic life support can be 
considered to be an aim (being active rather than passive) or a means (activities in order to 
obtain sustainable work and self-sufficiency). However, conditions for receiving basic social 
benefits for persons unable to provide for themselves combined with a sanctioning system, also 
comprises a perspective of claimants having to provide in order to receive. Commitments as 
conditions for social benefits can thus be regarded as so-called quasi-contracts, since it is 
formed between parties with different powers representing authorities on one side and 
unemployed persons on the other.  
Respondents from the three countries are unequivocal in their view that the introduction of 
compulsory activities has made the NAV/Job Centres work more targeted, both in assessing the 
claimants and in obtaining jobs and placements in the ordinary labour market as well as relevant 
courses/workshops for job seekers. Considering how work-promoting activities can be seen as 
part of the claimants’ rights, and the customising of targeted activities is a duty for NAV and 
Job Centres, it seems unjust that the individual is subject to the legal duty of commitments. 
In light of our respondents’ descriptions and our legal analysis, we have identified how 
securing the human rights of social benefits for individuals not complying or not coping with 
compulsory commitments, requires thorough legislation, securing agency systems and 
professional conduct. Imposed activities and sanctions, as well as restricted financial aid, puts 
pressure on individuals who, according to our respondents, experience complex health-related 
and social problems. The regimes also require financial resources with regards to, for example, 
the number of suitably qualified staff at Job Centres. This brings us to suggest considering the 
introduction of an unconditional universal basic income. According to Kildal146 the concept of 
an unconditional universal basic income for all citizens means ‘[e]veryone is to be guaranteed 
a certain minimum of finance, regardless who they are and how they choose to live their lives’. 
The author describes how such basic income enables people to provide for themselves and also 
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contribute to society, which they are unable to ‘when they are effected by unemployment and 
profound poverty’. The author acknowledges basic income as a ‘radical and controversial 
proposal’, but argues that the concept can neutralise the effects a destabilised work market has 
on individuals and families.147 This concept could represent a social security for all claimants, 
while NAV/Job Centres could focus on addressing and aiding the problems that cause claimants 
to not comply. 
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